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The federal government has undertaken a massive reorganization in order 
to create the Department of Homeland Security and a parallel debate over how to 
organize homeland security functions has arisen at the State and Local 
government levels.  In a time of severe budget constraints and rapidly changing 
threats, governments at all levels recognize the need for multiple government 
agencies, the private sector and non-governmental organizations to work 
together in order to provide effective homeland security. The effort to improve 
cooperation, especially at the “first responder” level, has become a major priority 
in the homeland security arena. How then can local governments, improve 
interagency cooperation for homeland security?   
A recent conference of government officials and homeland security 
experts concluded that the central coast of California has one of the best 
emergency preparedness systems in the country. This thesis examines the high 
level of interagency cooperation that has arisen among public safety agencies in 
Monterey County, California in order to determine what factors have contributed 
to their success and how they might be applied in other situations.  The author 
proposes that theories from multiple disciplines can provide insight into the 
likelihood and ability of organizations to cooperate.  By drawing on bureaucratic 
politics, epistemic community and network theories the author develops an 
integrated model of interagency cooperation that describes the impact of 
organizational structure, institutional learning and information technology on 
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The federal government has undertaken a massive reorganization in order 
to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and concurrent with this 
reorganization, state and local governments are evaluating their ability to 
respond to homeland security threats.  Government agencies, the private sector 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) recognize that they must to work 
together to provide effective homeland security.  While these efforts are largely in 
response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the issues being addressed were 
recognized by many experts prior to the attacks.  For example, a 2000 study by 
the Stimson Center investigated the ability of local governments to respond to a 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack and the federal government’s efforts 
to help develop these capabilities.  The title, “Ataxia,”1 is the one word summary 
of the report which depicted the state of confusion that typified the local response 
and the inability of the federal government to effect coordination between 
agencies.  The report found that federal money was profoundly misallocated on 
“assistance” in areas that were not needed while little if any money went to the 
purchase of sorely needed equipment.2  Since September 11, the debate has 
focused in large part on the common perception that first responders are unable 
to communicate with each other and that there is no command and control 
mechanism for a coordinated local response to a terrorist or WMD attack.  
While the debate ensues, local governments and first responders must 
continue to operate, responding to emergencies and natural disasters in a 
heightened security environment.  Some state and local governments are 
developing their own departments of Homeland Security while others simply do 
not have the resources for major reorganization.  Many governments have 
assigned responsibility for homeland security to whichever agency has primary 
responsibility for responding to other emergency situations.    
                                            
1 Lack of order or confusion, an inability to coordinate movement. 
2 Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism 
Threat and the Us Response (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2000). 
2 
Regardless of the organizational structure established for homeland 
security, cooperation between various governmental jurisdictions and with NGOs 
remains a critical and inescapable element of homeland security. Indeed, 
interagency cooperation in general is viewed as a key to developing good 
government practices.  In an era of substantial budget constraints many 
governments are looking towards interagency cooperation as a way to save 
resources by reducing redundancy. More importantly are the detrimental effects 
that a lack of interagency cooperation can have on the ability of an agency to 
perform even basic functions.   The so-called “intelligence failures” that were 
blamed for the lack of preparedness prior to the attacks of September 11th, were 
not so much failures as the inability of (or in some cases prohibition against) 
various agencies to coordinate their efforts and share information.  This need for 
cooperation has been expressed by government leaders at all levels and is 
frequently highlighted as a “key element” of homeland security in the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security and other key policy documents.3  In the midst of 
this emphasis on cooperation, there is little agreement regarding the specific 
actions government leaders and agencies should take to foster cooperation, and 
little clarity regarding what cooperation entails.  How then can local governments, 
improve interagency cooperation for homeland security?   
Like international cooperation, interagency cooperation is somewhat of a 
rarity. The typical governmental approach to cooperation is to mandate 
coordination through the creation of interagency committees and councils, or to 
restructure the lines of authority to place agencies that should cooperate with 
each other under the same leadership.  Attempts to mandate cooperation may 
sometimes produce tangible results, but are often regarded as ineffective if not 
counter-productive by those who participate in them as they tend  to  highlight the  
                                            
3 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Department of Homeland Security, 2002, 
accessed April 2003); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html. 
3 
areas of disagreement and develop into bargaining sessions in an effort to reach 
common ground.  As Thomas notes, these methods “tend to be seen as symbolic 
actions or struggles for political control.”4   
Conversely, examples of interagency cooperation that are heralded as 
successes are generally not driven by mandates or executive fiat, but develop at 
lower levels on the organizational chart.   The actions of executives may be an 
important aspect of the development of cooperation, but the explicit instruction 
for agencies to cooperate on a particular task is not.  The definition developed by 
Thomas in his investigation of epistemic communities is useful to describe this 
type of cooperation: “the unmandated effort by public officials in at least two 
agencies to coordinate their activities and/or share resources to achieve 
something they cannot achieve individually.”5  However, cooperative efforts 
should not be excluded simply because they don’t involve public officials, or 
because the agency could have accomplished the activity on its own.  Especially 
in the area of homeland security, the involvement of the private sector in 
cooperative efforts should not be discounted.  Furthermore, cooperation may be 
useful to reduce costs or redundancy, not just to accomplish things that could not 
otherwise be done.  Therefore, this thesis is based on the following definition of 
interagency cooperation: the unmandated coordination of activities and/or 
sharing of resources between two or more agencies.  In light of this definition, 
this thesis investigates cooperation in Monterey County, California, focusing on 
the Office of Emergency Services and the agencies and organizations which 
contribute to the planning and coordination of the county response to homeland 
security threats.    
A recent conference of government officials and homeland security 
experts concluded that the central coast of California has one of the best 
                                            
4 Craig W. Thomas, "Public Management as Interagency Cooperation: Testing Epistemic 
Community Theory at the Domestic Level," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
2 (1997): p. 224. 
5 Ibid.: p. 225. 
4 
emergency preparedness systems in the country.6  This thesis examines the high 
level of interagency cooperation that has arisen among public safety agencies in 
Monterey County, California in order to determine what factors have contributed 
to their success and how they might be applied in other situations.  The author 
proposes that theories from multiple disciplines can provide insight into the 
likelihood and ability of organizations to cooperate.  By drawing on bureaucratic 
politics, epistemic community and network theories the author develops an 
integrated model of interagency cooperation that describes the impact of 
organizational structure, institutional learning and information technology on 
interagency cooperation.   
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the development 
of cooperation in homeland security.  The analysis is based on three theoretical 
models that can be used to explain the lack or development of cooperation in 
organizations.  These models are based on bureaucratic political theory, 
epistemic community theory and network theory and have distinct strengths that 
complement each other.  Bureaucratic political theory focuses on the balance of 
competing interests among government agencies, and identifies goals, 
motivations and power as independent variables that can be used to identify the 
potential for cooperation between organizations. Epistemic community theory 
examines the role of ideas and the ability of like-minded professionals to 
influence policy in their respective organizations.  This model provides an 
indication of the willingness of multiple organizations to cooperate with each 
other by examining the presence and strength of such a community.  Network 
theory builds on these models by directly examining the ability of organizations to 
cooperate.  It assumes the opportunity and willingness to cooperate, and then 
measures their ability to cooperate based on their efficiency in sharing 
information and resources. 
                                            
6 Sylvia Moore, "County Ready for Terrorism," Monterey County Herald, March 28 2002. 
5 
This multi-disciplinary model of cooperation therefore examines 
cooperation based on three complementary hypotheses: 
· An opportunity for cooperation exists when the goals of the 
organizations are not attainable independently, the goals are not 
mutually excusive, and cooperation is not precluded by organizing 
principles or operational restrictions. 
· The willingness of agencies to cooperate is greater if there is an 
epistemic community that shares information and ideas between 
organizations and has the ability to influence the policies of the 
organizations. 
· The ability of agencies to cooperate is greater if the control structure 
and communication architecture allows for the efficient exchange of 
information and resources at multiple levels between and within 
agencies.   
 
None of these statements are by any means innovative.  Instead, this 
thesis attempts to apply these hypotheses outside of their typical fields of study 
and to combine them into a more complete model of cooperation.  By doing so, 
they can be used to describe interagency cooperation in local governments, 
particularly in the area of homeland security.  The first hypothesis provides 
insight into the impact of organizational structure on cooperation, indicating 
conditions that are more likely to result in cooperation.  The second hypothesis 
address the role of individuals and groups in interagency cooperation, showing 
also that ideas concerning good government practices can have a direct impact 
on the development of cooperation.  The last hypothesis examines the effect of 
information technologies on cooperation, showing that while it is not a panacea; 
the application of technology can affect both the ability of agencies to cooperate. 
   
C. CASE STUDY 
This thesis examines the Emergency Services Management System 
(ESMS) in Monterey County, California in order to test the applicability and 
usefulness of this theory to describe interagency cooperation at the local 
6 
government level.  Emergency response in non-metropolitan areas typically 
involves agencies from all levels of government, with municipal governments 
bearing the largest burden.  In area like Monterey County, however, the large 
number of small municipalities, and the large unincorporated areas, increases 
the importance of county agencies as both responders and coordinators.  
Therefore, while the response of municipal agencies is critical to the emergency 
management system of Monterey County, this thesis focuses primarily on the 
Monterey County Office of Emergency Services (OES) and those agencies that 
work directly with it to provide emergency management and response.    
This case was selected primarily because of high level of cooperation 
apparent in emergency services in Monterey County and the availability of 
information and accessibility of government officials in the local area.  On March 
27, 2002, Congressman Sam Farr (D-CA), whose district includes Monterey 
County, met with local officials and experts at the Naval Postgraduate School to 
discuss emergency response capabilities and concluded that the “Central Coast 
has one of the best coordinated emergency preparedness systems in the 
country. . .”7  If factors that contribute to this success can be identified, then they 
can be used to develop policy recommendations to help foster cooperation in 
other areas.  Several other factors were also considered that make this case both 
relevant and representative of interagency cooperation in local governments 
throughout the United States.   
First, there is no major metropolitan center in Monterey County. The 
structure and conduct of metropolitan governments have been more widely 
studied and are significantly different than that of other local governments.  In 
counties without a large metropolitan government, there  is  often   no   single 
government with the resources needed to respond to emergency situations; 
these counties must rely on the mutual assistance of city, county, state and 
federal agencies. 
                                            
7 Ibid. 
7 
Second, as in local governments across the country, the Monterey County 
OES has been given the additional responsibility of planning and coordinating the 
local response to terrorism, with little or no increase in resources.  Because of 
this local government officials are looking for ways to enhance interagency 
cooperation.   
Third, the terrain and environment of Monterey County make emergency 
management and response relatively difficult. The county’s large coastal 
mountain range limits movement by road from one part of the county to another 
and makes radio communication difficult.  Response crews have to drive for up to 
two hours to reach the more remote areas.  There are large wilderness areas 
that have frequent fires, and both the coastal and inland areas are subject to 
flooding.   
Finally, there are a large number of government jurisdictions in the county 
making interagency cooperation both more difficult and more important.  There 
are over twenty separate government agencies with jurisdiction in Monterey 
County, including twelve city governments, and large areas of state and federally 
controlled land.   
Hence, interagency cooperation that successfully overcomes these 
obstacles could hold valuable lessons for other localities that face similar 
challenges. 
 
1.  Sources and Conventions 
Monterey County government offices and officials provided most of the 
case study specific information in this thesis.  In addition to information these 
offices provide to the public via official documents and web pages, information 
was collected from interviews with individuals and groups representing local 
government and non-governmental agencies.  Because of the sensitive political 
nature of some of the issues discussed in these interviews, a policy of non-
attribution was sometimes followed.  These interviews are referenced only by 
year and type of agency for which the subject works.  Some offices, notably 
8 
OES, allowed the author to observe training exercises, daily operations and 
coordination meetings.  Information gathered from these events are referenced 
only by date and event.  The author also served for over a year on the Sheriff’s 
Department Search and Rescue team where he was able to observe and 
participate in interagency field operations.  Information gathered during these 
operations is provided only as general commentary and is not referenced. 
Throughout this thesis, reference is made to networks of various types 
including associations of people, technical equipment and protocols used to 
facilitate data transfer between computers, groups of similar communication 
devices used for a particular purpose, in addition to other meanings.  No attempt 
is made here to develop or follow a single coherent definition of a network, the 
word is simply used in its various contemporary meanings.  
 
2.  Monterey County Government 
Monterey is recognized as a “general law” county under the California 
constitution, meaning that county government structure and offices are defined 
by state law as opposed to a county charter or constitution.   The county has 
limited jurisdiction and authority, as allowed by state law, to make and enforce 
statutes, provided for the public good and to raise and spend money.  County 
jurisdiction does not extend into incorporated cities or state or federal property 
located within the county except by agreement with the jurisdictional authority.  
General Law counties in California are governed by a Board of Supervisors 
which has functions of both the legislative and executive branches of 
government.  The Superior Court exercises  judicial authori ty and several offices  
including the Sheriff, Clerk and Treasurer are separately elected officials.  Cities 
within the county are not subject to the county government but are directly 
chartered by the State.8   
 
                                            
8 About California Counties, (California State Association of Counties, 2003, accessed April 
2003); available from http://www.csac.counties.org. 
9 
3.  The Office of Emergency Services 
The State of California has established a basic structure for Emergency 
Management throughout the state referred to as the Standardized Emergency 
Management System (SEMS).  This system establishes the basic jurisdictional 
boundaries for emergency management, the Operational Area (OA), and 
establishes certain organizational guidelines for Emergency Services 
Management (ESM) in an OA.  The Monterey OA, as do many other, non-
metropolitan OAs throughout the state, corresponds to the Monterey County 
boundaries, and in accordance with SEMS the management of the Monterey OA 
has been delegated to Monterey County. 
The Monterey County Office of Emergency Services has been organized 
following the SEMS guidelines which allow for a flexible structure that can be 
augmented as needed during an emergency.  A minimal staff of four full-time 
employees conducts the command, planning, logistics, administrative and 
financial aspects of emergency preparedness during normal conditions.  During a 
crisis each of these functions would be designated as a section and staffed as 
needed by employees of other county offices and representatives of a wide 
variety of government and non-governmental agencies.   
However, emergency response within the incorporated cities is the direct 
responsibility of the city government, not the county.  The various city 
governments in the county must approve mutual aid agreements between the 
various agencies; and even during a crisis situation retain primary control for the 
response within their jurisdiction. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized according to the theories used, including in each 
chapter a brief review of the literature, a description of the methodology used, 
case study information relevant to the application of the theory, and an analysis 
of the implications of the theory in regards to the development of cooperation.  
10 
While each chapter examines a distinct aspect of cooperation, they also build on 
the hypotheses developed in the preceding chapters.   
Chapter II is an examination of ESM in Monterey County in light of 
organizational and bureaucratic political theory.  The model of decision-making 
proposed by bureaucratic political theory, proposed initially by Graham Allison, is 
primarily concerned with the development of foreign policy as a result of tensions 
and competing goals of agencies, but these same factors impact the 
development and execution of domestic policy as well.  In addition to Allison’s 
work, this chapter draws from works by Henry Kissinger,9 David Kozak10 and 
Perry Smith11 among others.    
The Emergency Services Management System (ESMS) in Monterey 
County is comprised of agencies whose primary purpose may have little to do 
with emergency response but whose assistance is nevertheless required for a 
county-wide response.   The Office of Emergency Services was established to 
coordinate the response of these various agencies and to balance their often 
competing concerns and motivations.   Bureaucratic political theory recognizes 
that policy decisions and governmental actions are a result of interactions 
between these agencies.  Furthermore, it indicates that actions by individual 
players can have a significant impact on outcomes and provides normative 
guidance for players to follow when trying to influence the decisions of their 
governments.12  Organizational theory complements the “where you stand 
depends on where you sit” aspect of the bureaucratic political theory by directly 
examining the structure of complex organizations.  As Snook concludes in his 
analysis of the 1994 UH-60 fratricide case in Northern Iraq, the structure of an 
organization itself can have a critical impact on policy and action, resulting, in the 
                                            
9 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957). 
10 David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, Bureaucratic Politics and National Security : 
Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988). 
11 Perry Smith, Assignment--Pentagon: How to Excel in a Bureaucracy (Washington: 
Brossey's, 2002). 
12 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications," World Politics 24, no. Supplement: Theory and Policy in International 
Relations (1972). 
11 
worst case, in the tragic failure to communicate vital information.13   Chapter II 
describes the structure of this system and identify the competing interests of the 
major agencies involved.  In doing so I will attempt to identify the major obstacles 
to cooperation within the Monterey County ESMS and to propose policies that 
can be implemented in a bureaucratic system to mitigate these obstacles and 
foster, instead of mandate, cooperation.  
Chapter III is an exploration of the role of ideas in ESMS, particularly the 
application of epistemic community theory to the development of interagency 
cooperation. Epistemic community theory proposes that the development of 
coherent policies across agencies and governments is more likely if there is a 
community of like-minded professionals among the agencies that share ideas 
across bureaucratic boundaries.14  Epistemic community theory reflects the 
broader notion that ideas themselves play a significant role in the development 
and application of policy in government – that good ideas span differences in 
organizational motivations and that leaders can and do adopt these ideas as 
policy.  Although much of the work concerning the role of ideas in the 
development of policy has been focused at the international level, Craig Thomas 
and others have proposed that they are applicable at the domestic level as 
well.15  In addition to his article, works by Peter Hass,16 Emanuel Adler,17 Ernst 
Haas,18 and Daniel Drezner19 are also considered.  Within the Monterey County 
ESMS there is a small group of individuals from various agencies that seems to 
be responsible for a majority of the cooperative efforts. In this chapter I will 
                                            
13 Scott A. Snook, Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Blackhawks over 
Northern Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
14 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992). 
15 Thomas. 
16 Haas. 
17 Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the 
International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," International Organization 46, no. 1 
(1992). 
18 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International 
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
19 Daniel W. Drezner, "Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy," 
American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000). 
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examine the various ESM cooperative efforts in Monterey County, analysis the 
involvement of this core group and evaluate the applicability to epistemic 
community theory to this situation.  Furthermore I will explore the possibility and 
utility of fostering the development of such a community and the exchange of 
ideas within and between homeland security agencies. 
Chapter IV will focus on the technical aspects of cooperation.  Modern 
network theory argues that information technology can have a direct impact on 
cooperation as the increased ability to access and share information overcomes 
the inherent inefficiencies associated with non-hierarchical organizations.20  John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have co-authored several pieces on this topic.21  
Eugene Bardach,22 Dorothy Denning,23 Gregory Rattray24 and Bill Owens25 have 
made important contributions to this emerging field as well. Some network 
theorists propose that the application of IT can foster cooperation by allowing 
organizations to overcome bureaucratic obstacles as agencies with similar but 
separate goals and motivations share information and resources in a peer-to-
peer network rather than through traditional chains of authority.26  This chapter 
examines the control systems and information architecture in the Monterey 
County ESM and its impact on interagency cooperation.   Additionally, this 
chapter contains an overview of existing technologies that might be applicable to 
                                            
20 John Arquilla and others, In Athena's Camp : Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), p.5. 
21 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars : The Future of Terror, Crime, 
and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001). 
22 Eugene Bardach, "Can Network Theory Illuminate Interagency Collaboration," in 
Workshop on Network analysis and Innovations in Public Programs (University of Wisconsin-
Madison: 1994). 
23 Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning, Information Warfare and Security (New York Reading, 
Ma.: ACM Press ; Addison-Wesley, 1999). 
24 Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). 
25 William A. Owens and Edward Offley, Lifting the Fog of War, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar 
Straus and Giroux, 2000). 
26 Robert W. Button Walter Perry, Jerome Bracken, Thomas Sullivan, and Jonathan Mitchell, 
Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy: The Effects of Network-Centric 
Operations on Combat Outcomes (Rand, 2002). 
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the fields of homeland security and emergency management and how these 
technologies might be incorporated into the Monterey County ESMS. 
The final chapter returns to the political and budgetary situation of the 
Monterey County ESMS and considers the practical implications of the proposals 
developed in the other chapters.  In the development of policy proposals, 
particular attention will be given to those proposals that can be implemented at 
the OES level with little or no impact on the budget, and to those policy 
implications that may apply outside of the Monterey County System to other local 
and regional governmental agencies involved in homeland security.  In order to 
develop these proposals it will be necessary to make comparisons across the 
theories as discussed in Chapters II, III and IV, returning to the questions of 
applicability, scope and value of the various theories.  Are there areas outside 
the scope of one theory that are addressed by another?  Do the theories indicate 
similar problems and solutions to questions of cooperation?  This thesis 
proposes that that these theories are complementary and can be used together 
to describe cooperation at the local level, and to develop policies to foster inter-
agency and extra-governmental cooperation.  Finally, several general policy 
recommendations are made that if adopted by local governments would help to 
foster interagency cooperation, particularly for emergency response and 
homeland security.  Many of these recommendations could be adopted as 
effective management practices within agencies regardless of the actions of 
government as a whole, while others indicate how capital expenditures and 
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II. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the political/bureaucratic structure of the Monterey 
County Emergency Services Management System (ESMS), and the impact this 
structure has on the development of interagency cooperation.  Structural 
approaches in general argue that the organization of a system and the rules 
which govern how the system works provide explanatory and predictive insight 
into outcomes.  Bureaucratic political theory specifically attributes the decisions 
and actions of a government to the political bargaining of key players whose 
positions on issues are largely determined by their position in the bureaucracy.  
This chapter examines the applicability of this model to the Monterey County 
ESMS, highlighting the differences between national and local government 
structure, and showing that these structural differences allow for a wider set of 
potential outcomes than is typically suggested by bureaucratic politics theory.  
Recent budget and policy decisions regarding homeland security are examined 
to judge the applicability of the theoretical model, and major bureaucratic 
obstacles to the development of cooperation in a local government setting are 
identified.  Finally, policy options that may help overcome these obstacles are 
proposed. 
Graham Allison’s work, Essence of Decision, opens up the black box of 
governmental decision-making in national security.  Instead of the unitary 
national actor, operating to maximize power in its relationships with other states, 
Allison recognized that governments are made up of sub-state actors who may 
have goals and motivations that contrast and are in competition with those of 
other sub-state actors.27  In the bureaucratic political theory literature, these 
actors are most often referred to as players, which lends itself to viewing policy 
making as a game and national security policy as the outcome of the game.  
Bureaucratic political theory has grown out of the Allison’s model and provides a 
                                            
27 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1971). 
16 
powerful tool for answering three fundamental questions of international 
relations. First, “why did a state take a particular action?”  Second, “what action is 
a state likely to take in a particular situation?”  Third, “how can a sub-state actor 
influence the actions of a state?”28  While these questions are particularly 
pertinent in international relations, if the bureaucratic political model is valid, then 
might it also be useful for examining questions of domestic policy?   
At first look, examining domestic policy using a bureaucratic political 
model seems redundant.  After all, the unitary state actor that bureaucratic 
political theory breaks apart is not assumed in domestic policy theory, especially 
as it relates to policy in a democratic/federal system like the United States.  
Nevertheless the domestic policy game is very similar to the development of a 
state’s international policy.  Domestic policy at the federal as well as the state 
and local levels can be described as the result of the competing interests of the 
various players.  This model may be particularly suited for examining homeland 
security policy as it is at the intersection of domestic and national security policy.   
It is also interesting to note that homeland security policy shares a connotation of 
importance with national security policy that Allison notes makes a unitary actor 
model preferred.  Allison recognizes that “to accuse someone of ‘playing politics’ 
with national security is a most serious charge.”29  This holds for homeland 
security policy as well.  Like national security policy, homeland security policy is 
not determined by a unitary actor, but by bargaining – by the game of domestic 
politics. 
Understandably, crisis decision-making is at the core of many of the case 
studies that have been used to develop bureaucratic political theory.  Analysis of 
crisis decision-making not only provides a clear measure of policy outcomes (that 
is, publicly announced decisions and government action), but also analyzes that 
area of national security policy where “playing politics” is least acceptable.  
However, the vast majority of national security policy cannot be labeled as crisis 
                                            
28 Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." 
29 Ibid.: pp. 42-44. 
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decision-making, and with very few exceptions the same is true for homeland 
security policy.  Several works, including those by Jayne, Rockman and 
Seidman, clearly show that the bureaucratic political model is just as applicable 
in the mundane day-to-day development of policy and budget as it is in crisis 
decision-making.30 
A traditional bureaucratic politics model would indicate that a process of 
bargaining and struggle for expanded resources and importance would be the 
result of a significant event such as September 11th.  This model provides an 
accurate description of the decisions and actions taken by the federal 
government as it responded with the development of DHS.  While there was 
agreement that changes must be made, there was significant disagreement and 
debate concerning how the issues should be addressed and how DHS should be 
organized.  The final result represented a bargaining solution where strong, 
independent agencies such as the Coast Guard retained significant autonomy, 
while other agencies with less bargaining power, such as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) have been virtually dissolved.  These agreements 
were reached with significant bargaining and the decision of the President as the 
final significant arbiter of the proposal that was adopted by Congress.  However, 
if a bureaucratic politics model is to be applicable in these situations, it should 
also be able to account for more cooperative responses by governments as well.  
In the case of Monterey County, the events of September 11th seem to have 
resulted in more, not less, cooperation. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Allison and Halperin provide a simple, useful model of bureaucratic politics 
based on three independent variables: who plays; what determines a player’s 
position; and how these positions are aggregated into an outcome.31  Although 
this model does not rule out cooperation and agreement, it does assume that 
                                            
30 Kozak and Keagle. 
31 Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," 
pp. 46-47. 
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cooperation is not the natural state of affairs.  At the time the article was first 
published this notion of “security policy as ‘political’ result”32 was contrary to 
conventional wisdom which held that the national interest took precedence, 
resulting in agreement and cooperation in national security matters.  Allison and 
Halperin describe a non-cooperative bargaining process in which “organizations 
rarely take stands that require elaborate coordination with other players.”33   
While these situations are indeed rare, there are certain elements of the game, 
particularly the structure of the organization and the environment in which the 
game is played that seem to have a direct impact on cooperation and are useful 
in describing the situations where cooperation may develop:   
· The central executive, as described in the Allison-Halperin model, may 
limit the opportunity for cooperation as it is defined here.  The absence 
of a central executive reduces the chance that an agency will be forced 
to coordinate, making non-mandated cooperative efforts more likely.  
· Self-interested motivations may increase the opportunity for 
cooperation, when players take stands that are mutually beneficial or 
promote a related interest.   
· The opportunity for cooperation is greater if the players have 
complimentary goals but lack the resources to accomplish those goals 
alone. 
 
1. The Central Executive 
The Allison-Halperin model places large emphasis on the role of the 
president or other central executives in arbitrating disagreement among the other 
senior players and making the ultimate decisions, as well as heavily influencing 
action games in which he is a less active player.  The result of this arbitration 
process often resembles (and is even often called) cooperation as 
communication between agencies increases and resources are transferred or 
reallocated.  In some cases the objective of cooperation, that is, the ability for an 
agency to achieve objectives that it would otherwise not be able so achieve, may 
even be reached.  This would be the ideal outcome of a bureaucratic system as 
                                            
32 Ibid.: p. 43. 
33 Ibid.: p. 49. 
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envisioned by Weber, but as Allison describes, is seldom the situation in reality.  
In most cases the directive to share resources and increase communication is 
carried out grudgingly at best, and is often sabotaged by players as they continue 
to maneuver for the self-interests of their agency.  Removing the central 
executive from the game, as would be the case in many local government 
situations, would have a significant impact on the bureaucratic political model.   
Without the pressure of the mandated coordination, agencies would have more 
flexibility to communicate and share resources as they see fit.  While the over-all 
incidence of these activities would likely decrease, those that continue would 
clearly be classified as “non-mandated efforts,” (i. e. cooperation). 
Additionally the lack of a senior executive would have a significant impact 
on a player’s position on any given issue.  Without the potential for an 
authoritative decision in any one player’s favor, each player must select a 
position that is potentially acceptable to other players.34 Finally, as Allison and 
Halperin note, in cases where there is little potential for the individual players to 
become the senior executive, personal political gain from a game is less 
important.   
Removing the senior executive from the game affects how decisions are 
made.  Without a senior executive, there are two potential ways to determine the 
outcome of a game: either each player decides or acts in accordance with his 
position and resources (in which case a game doesn’t really exist), or else the 
decision is made by some type of vote or consensus with the players agreeing to 
abide by the outcome.35  An alternative arrangement might also exist where 
there is a senior executive, but he remains aloof and only makes a decision if the 
senior players fail to reach an agreement.  In this case, involvement of the central 
                                            
34 This assumes that in the particular game the participation of at least some other players is 
essential to any acceptable outcome.  If a situation exists where a single player has the resources 
and authority to carry out an acceptable outcome, then the involvement of other players is likely 
to be seen as a burden and no “game” will develop at all. 
35 This vote might be held by a committee made up of the senior players, or by a large, more 
inclusive group.  However in the case where the vote is held by a committee of non- or marginal 
players, the committee would be serving, in effect, as the senior executive and the game would 
more closely resemble Allison’s.   
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executive may be perceived as a failure of the senior players and the game might 
proceed as if there were no central executive.  Except in the case of autonomous 
action described above, bargaining, as Allison and Halperin argue, remains a key 
component of the process.   
They also note that the bargaining process may entail significant 
compromise as players try to gain adherents to their preferred solution.  In the 
situation where the decision is made by a formal voting process, this bargaining 
process is likely to proceed much as Allison and Halperin describe, with the 
result determined by each player’s advantages, their “skill and will” in bargaining, 
and other players’ perceptions.36  Consensus decision-making may resemble this 
bargaining process as players trade position for consensus; however the result of 
the process can be substantially different, ending not in a pile of bargaining chips 
that reflects the priorities of each player but in a more coherent solution that 
expresses the collective views of the group.    
2. Motivations to Cooperate  
 The Allison-Halperin model argues that the stand a player takes is largely 
determined by the institutional goals and biases that the player represents, as 
well as by his personal goals; in short, “where you stand depends on where you 
sit.”  This model is very helpful in understanding why players might take a 
position that is clearly not in the national interest, or how a debate might arise 
concerning the proper response to a crisis.  These organizational motivations are 
typically presented as drawing the players’ positions further apart as the players 
seek to increase their personal or organizational position, power and resources.  
However, there can also be organizational motivations that either move the 
positions closer together, or make cooperation more valuable in general.   As 
Allison and Halperin note, a player is likely to be most protective of what he sees 
as his organization’s primary role.  The case may arise where it is in the 
organization’s  interest  to  side  with   a  customary  opponent  in  order  to  shed  
                                            
36 Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," p. 
50. 
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secondary roles and reallocate resources to the primary, or to bank goodwill with 
another player than can be used to support his position in a future, more 
important exchange. 
Blame avoidance might also motivate a player to take a position that is 
more cooperative.  While a particular stand may not meet the organization goals 
of a player directly, it might serve to deflect the loss of resources and reputation 
that would result from being blamed for a governmental failure.  Conversely, in 
situations where blame for failure may not be an issue, the potential gain in 
resources and reputation that would result from being “part of the solution” may 
be enough for some players to adopt a more cooperative position.  As Allison 
and Halperin surmise, organizational and personal interests usually have the 
most impact on determining the stand that players take.  However, cooperation is 
more likely to develop when those interests are convergent with the interests of 
other players. 
3. Overlapping Goals and Resources 
A common bureaucratic politics game begins with a struggle for resources 
between two agencies that have similar roles but neither enough resources nor 
enough power to fully carry out those roles.  The game typically ends with one 
agency being stripped of its role and its resources being allocated to the other, or 
with a tense agreement that balances roles and resources and dictates 
“cooperation.”  These types of outcomes are common in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and would generally be categorized in the Allison-Halperin model 
as a postponement of the decision.  In these cases, not only is there no clear 
winner, but because the issue is never resolved, no real cooperation between the 
agencies develops.   Instead,  a  struggle  for resources and dominance develops 
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which may continue indefinitely.37  This situation also presents the opportunity for 
log-rolling, that is, the players providing mutual support in order to increase the 
overall pool of resources.   
However a third outcome is possible when the agencies involved cut 
across jurisdictional boundaries and there is little potential for final arbitration, 
reallocation (either permanent or cyclic) of resources, or an increase in overall 
resources (such as the current budget crises in Monterey County).  In this case 
there are two potential outcomes.  First, the players might pursue their roles with 
their own resources – in effect there is no game.  In this situation there are likely 
to be significant redundancies and/or gaps depending on the resources available.  
The second possible outcome is for the players to engage in a cooperative 
game, working together to allocate scarce resources with a minimum of 
redundancy and gaps.  This is admittedly an unlikely outcome unless there are 
other factors that would also motivate the players to cooperate. 
In summary, while the bureaucratic political models typically explains the 
conditions that lead to a non-cooperative game where players struggle for roles, 
resources and power, there are conditions that might indidicate a cooperative 
game.  These conditions in themselves do not ensure a cooperative effort 
between the players, but do establish the basic conditions required for 
cooperation to develop.  First, when there is no central executive, other players 
might be more willing to make concessions and develop consensus.   Second, 
cooperation is more likely to develop if there are self-interested motivations.  
Finally, when there can be no clear “winner” and no player has the resources 
needed for its goals, cooperation would be the optimal solution. 
C. CASE STUDY   
As described by the Allison-Halperin model, a bureaucratic politics game 
may be started either when external events demand a government decision or 
                                            
37 Take, for example, the struggle for resources that has developed around Theater Missile 
Defense.  While the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has been established as a 
“cooperative” effort by the joint community, its main role is to serve as a referee between the 
services as they each develop their pet projects and fight for dominance and resources. 
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action, or when a player wants to generate a decision or action.  They also note 
that there are often multiple sub-games that may be taking place at the same 
time, and that these games often proceed based on established patterns of 
decision-making or action channels.38  In Monterey County the “official” action 
channel is through the Board of Supervisors, but in reality decision-making 
resides primarily with the various department heads, who have significant 
autonomy in their respective areas. 
The central game in the emergency management arena in Monterey 
County is the same game being played out around the country.  Triggered by the 
events of September 11, 2001, governments at all levels are investigating, 
reorganizing and re-funding all aspects of emergency response and homeland 
defense.  Related sub-games in Monterey include requests for federal funding 
being channeled through DHS, and a California-wide budget crisis caused 
primarily by the collapse of the dot-com bubble.    
As in most bureaucratic politics games, the primary concern for most 
players is the retention or increase of roles, resources and power.  However, 
these games seem to exhibit a higher level of cooperation than many other 
games and therefore should exhibit the characteristics discussed above.  In order 
to examine these games more closely, this section provides an overview of the 
players, positions and motivations of the senior players, then examines how the 
games have progressed so far and to what extent they exhibit the characteristics 
of a cooperative game. 
1. The Monterey Emergency Management Bureaucracy 
a. Board of Supervisors 
  The County Board of Supervisors is a group of five elected officials 
representing geographic districts.39  By California State Law this board has both 
legislative and executive authority for the county, but its members have no 
authority to act individually – all official decisions and actions must be made by 
                                            
38 Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." 
39 About California Counties, (accessed). 
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the board as a whole.  Furthermore, executive powers are limited as the board 
does not have the authority to change duty descriptions established by State 
Law, or, except in limited circumstances, to supervise other elected officials in 
the county such as the Sheriff or Clerk.40 
  Individual members of this board have several potential 
motivations, including the desire to be re-elected or to be elected to other 
positions in government.  This is likely not a strong motivator as Supervisors are 
elected for five year terms, in generally unopposed races.  Election to other posts 
would likely require party support so Supervisors are unlikely to take positions 
that are fundamentally opposed to their party; beyond this, party affiliation is 
insignificant in local politics and none of the Supervisors make a point of carrying 
a party label.   
 As the individual Supervisors have no authority outside of the 
board, the motivations of the board as a group are perhaps most important.  The 
current Board has adopted a set of “Guiding Principles” that reflect their primary 
concerns.  These principles, along with a set of “Goals and Objectives” 
encourage among other things, “risk taking,” “coordinated planning,” “cost-saving 
ideas” and “collaboration.”41  While these phrases largely reflect the buzz words 
that can be found in many modern organizational documents, they provide an 
official backing to collaborative efforts.  The ideas were further reinforced by the 
Board of Supervisors during the selection of the County Administrative Office 
(CAO) in 1999 when they publicly sought a candidate that would “improve the 
relationships between the county and other governmental agencies.”42  These 
actions by the board drop barriers to cooperation that are found in many 
government situations where cooperation is prohibited by the restriction of 
authority or punished (often inadvertently) by the reduction of roles and 
resources. 
                                            
40 Ibid.(accessed). 
41 New Employee Orientation Manual (Monterey County, 2002). 
42 Interview, Veronica Ferguson, Monterey County Office of Administration, May 12, (Salinas, 
CA: 2003). 
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Other motivations of the Board likely center around the drive to be a 
competent, involved and effective governmental body, and to be recognized as 
such by the other players.  In short they want to do a good job as a board, and be 
recognized.  Since terrorism and homeland security have been high on the public 
agenda across the nation the Board of Supervisors was likely to add to the 
discussion as well as to respond publicly to situations as they arose.  They are 
unlikely to publicly cut budgets and activities related to homeland defense. 
 
b. County Administrative Officer 
The County Administrative Officer (CAO) is appointed by the Board 
of Supervisors, has primary responsibility for the daily operations of most non-
elected County Offices, and has some control over the Board of Supervisors 
agenda. The COA also serves as the ex-officio head of many departments, 
including the Office of Emergency Services.  The current CAO, Sally Reed, has 
delegated many of these ex-officio duties to the Assistant CAO, which creates 
another level of bureaucracy between these departments and the Board of 
Supervisors. The CAO is not the final arbiter of disputes between agencies, but 
does attempt to resolve issues before they are presented to the Board.  One of 
the primary responsibilities of the CAO is to manage the county budget process, 
including the development of many department budgets and the presentation of 
the overall budget proposal to the Board of Supervisors. When the Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) is activated the CAO must either assume her duties as 
the ex-officio Director of the EOC or appoint an alternate.43   
As an unelected official, the CAO is less concerned with public 
opinion than is the Board of Supervisors.  She may even view publicity as an 
obstacle in performing her duties, not wanting to generate public debate on 
controversial decisions that have to be made by her, her staff and the board.  As 
the chief administrator and financial officer, her primary motivation is the efficient 
operation of the county government – public opinion is less important than expert 
                                            
43 County of Monterey, (Monterey County, 2003, accessed Apr 2003); available from 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us. 
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opinion.  The overall success of the county government is more important than 
the individual success or growth of any one department. In addition, if resources 
can be gained in any department through state or federal funding, this reduces 
the allocation problems for the county as a whole.  Finally, responsibilities should 
be kept out of the county jurisdiction when practical as increased responsibilities 
would not likely be supported by increased resources. 
Finally, the CAO was hired specifically as an integrator with a 
charge from the Board of Supervisors to improve relationships. The CAO 
therefore would likely encourage cooperative efforts, and in light of the significant 
budget constraints support efforts by OES and other agencies to apply for grants 
being offered by DHS – as long as these grants don’t require that the County 
take on new responsibilities.  She would also be unlikely to propose the 
reallocation of resources from other agencies into OES, Health, or other 
response agencies in response to an increased public awareness of the threat.   
 
c. Emergency Services Manager 
The Emergency Services Manager is appointed by the CAO/Board 
of Supervisors, and, although he holds the title of Deputy Director of the Office of 
Emergency Services (OES), has the autonomy to run the office as the Director 
except during a crisis.  The Emergency Services Manager is responsible for 
planning and managing the county government response to natural disasters and 
other emergency situations including terrorist attacks, and for coordinating the 
county government response with other government jurisdictions and non-
governmental organizations.  A primary responsibility of the Emergency Services 
Manager is maintaining the  Emergency  Operations Center and training the EOC  
staff.  There are three other full-time positions in the Office of Emergency 
Services, but all other EOC staff positions are filled by representatives of other 
departments and agencies.44 
                                            
44 Monterey County Emergency Management Services, "Monterey Operational Area 
Emergency Operations Plan," (Salinas, California: County of Monterey, 1999). 
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A basic motivation for cooperation discussed above, that is, the 
lack of resources to accomplish goals that overlap with other agencies, 
particularly applies to the Emergency Services Manager.  In effect, he is implicitly 
charged with developing cooperative efforts as he does not control the resources 
that would be used in a crisis situation. The principal task of OES is to plan, 
coordinate and control the county response to an emergency situation – there is 
no expectation that this agency has the internal resources needed to respond to 
an emergency situation independently.  Because of this the manager is likely to 
have a higher awareness of, and be more responsive to, the threats posed by 
natural disasters and terrorism and will argue for increased resources for OES as 
well as contributing agencies regardless of the funding source.    
 
d. County Sheriff 
The County Sheriff is legally an elected official of the State 
Government, and as such has significant autonomy within the county.  Although 
the sheriff is nominally supervised by the Board of Supervisors, their authority 
does not extend into the Sheriff’s role as an officer of the State or the courts and 
they have no authority to remove or censure the Sheriff.  The Sheriff’s 
Departments is one of the largest departments in the county with a staff of over 
450, including law enforcement, corrections and Search and Rescue duties.   
The department is funded primarily through the county general fund resulting in 
public protection as the largest line item (consistently over 30%) in the $500 
million county budget.45 
The current Sheriff, Mike Kanalakis, has stated that an improved 
response to the threat of terrorism and the application of technology are two of 
his top priorities.46  As an elected official, these priorities reflect his perception of 
the concerns of the community.  His emphasis on terrorism and technology is 
                                            
45 Monterey County, County of Monterey(2003, accessed Apr 2003); available from 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us. 
46 Sheriff Kanalakis’ priorities (listed in his order) are: “Employee Recruitment and Retention; 
Drug Related Crimes; Gang Enforcement; School Violence; Jail Overcrowding; The Threat of 
Terrorism; Rural and Hate Crimes; Environmental Crimes;  Applying New Technology.”  From  
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/sheriff/mcso/index2.htm; Accessed April 2003 
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likely to be coordinated with his other priorities, resulting in increased emphasis 
and allocation of resources to those activities that can have a positive effect on 
several priorities.  There is the potential for blame avoidance as an additional 
motivator, the Sheriff wanting to ensure that in any circumstance it will not appear 
that his department has been negligent or unprepared.  This motivation is 
potentially heightened by the negative press that the department, and the 
previous Sheriff, received regarding accidental shootings and other complaints.47  
 
e. Civil Grand Jury 
The Civil Grand Jury system in California has been established by 
U. S. and California Law to serve as a government “watchdog” agency as well as 
to bring formal criminal charges against public officials when needed.  The 
members of the Grand Jury in Monterey are private citizens appointed by the 
Superior Court for a period of one year.  The Grand Jury is specifically authorized 
to inspect and audit the books and records of county and city governments and 
to ensure that public officials are carrying out their duties.48 
The Civil Grand Jury’s motivation as a group is likely to make a 
positive impact on their community.  The Civil Grand Jury is made up of 19 
jurors, selected by the Superior Court from a pool of voluntary applicants.  
Remuneration is negligible and the time commitment is substantial (usually less 
than $2000 a year for up to 30 hours a month of duty) and a juror cannot serve 
consecutively, so there is little financial motivation to serve as a juror.  Assuming 
this “do-gooder” motivation of the members, the jury is likely to take positions that 
generally reflect public opinions and priorities.  As they have substantial leeway 
in what they examine in their general investigations, the areas selected to study 
would also  likely  reflect  their  perceptions  of  community  priorities.   Thus they  
                                            
47 See for example, "Sheriff's Actions Taint Department," Monterey County Herald, 
September 27 2002. 
48 The Superior and Municipal Courts of the State of California in and for the County of 
Monterey, Grand Jury Report 2002(2002, accessed April 2003); available from 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/court/grand_jury_report_2002/index.html. 
29 
would be likely to call for increased funding and emphasis in counter-terrorism 
and homeland security, and also retain homeland security as an issue in order to 
prevent fraud and ensure that additional funds are not wasted. 
 
f. Emergency Communications Manager 
The Emergency Communications Manager directs the county-wide 
911 and emergency dispatch center and is responsible for coordinating 
emergency response with other local dispatch centers and first responders.  The 
Emergency Communications Department is a separate department within the 
County Government, with the CAO serving as the ex-officio director.49 
The Emergency Communications Manager is likely motivated 
primarily by the need for his staff to operate continually in a stressful, emergency 
management environment.  Long-term measures and preparation for crisis 
situations are likely somewhat less important to him than resources that can be 
immediately applied to improve emergency response.   The Emergency 
Communications Managers responsibility to provide for a quick, appropriate 
response during emergencies has significant overlap with the goals of 
responding agencies and provides substantial incentives for cooperation as he 
does not control the resources to ensure this goal is met. 
 
g. California Emergency Services Director 
The California Emergency Services Director is responsible for 
coordinating the state-wide response to terrorist and other emergency situations.  
Although he does not have authority over how local resources are allocated, the 
California Office of Emergency Services (OES) does serve as a primary source 
of State and Federal funding available to augment local resources.  These funds 
are generally targeted to achieve particular capabilities such as enhancing inter-
connectivity or ensuring a distribution of capabilities throughout the state.  
Similarly, the State OES does not directly manage the organization and operation 
                                            
49 County of Monterey, (accessed). 
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of the County OES, but does have substantial informal influence thought the 
publication of “Local Planning Guides” and information databases.50 
The State Director’s motivations are likely similar to the Monterey 
County Emergency Manager’s.  The State director is probably more concerned 
with budget allocation issues, attempting to ensure that local governments 
receive appropriate additional funding, while avoiding the blame situation that 
would be caused by a significant incident for which the State OES was 
unprepared or unable to respond.  The Sates director’s priorities however, are 
understandably focused on the major metropolitan areas in the state. 
 
h. Pacific Gas & Electric 
Although not a government agency, as the primary utility company 
in the area, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) is a senior player in emergency 
policy and response.  In an emergency situation PG&E crews are expected to 
coordinate their response with other first and field response units.  They have 
been allocated space within the County EOC and participate in policy 
discussions and training exercises.51 
As a publicly traded corporation, PG&E’s primary motivation is to 
maximize shareholder value.  How this motivation translates into the area of 
emergency preparedness may be tied to public perception and blame avoidance.  
From a purely business perspective the utility wants to spend as little money as 
possible preparing for low-frequency events, while ensuring that when service is 
interrupted they are able to return power quickly.  However public opinion also 
has an impact on the regulatory environment that PG&E must operate in, and, as 
evidenced by the commercials currently airing in California that depict crews 
responding to storm outages, PG&E considers this an important factor.  In 
addition, the worst public-relations situation for PG&E is an extended outage that 
they seem unwilling or unable to repair.  This possibility likely helps generate a 
                                            
50 Governor's Office of Emergency Services, (State of California, 2003, accessed April 2003); 
available from http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf. 
51 "Monterey Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan," (Salinas, California: County of 
Monterey, 1999). 
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robust and cooperative attitude from PG&E in policy planning as well as in 
emergency response.  They would likely oppose policies that would have 
significant financial impact, but would be more willing to develop infrastructure 
and capabilities with a dual use or a potential for low-cost public relations gains. 
 
i. County Director of Health 
The Monterey County Director of Health is responsible for 
managing the County Department of Health, coordinating emergency medical 
and health services throughout the county.   The Director certifies emergency 
medical providers, issues health alerts and guidance on public health issues, and 
tracks outbreaks of communicable diseases.  During an emergency situation the 
department coordinates efforts to prevent the outbreak of disease resulting from 
poor sanitation and to manage emergency medical resources.  The department 
would likely be the local agency that would recognize and manage the response 
to a biological or chemical attack.52  There are few structural motivations for the 
Director of Health to develop cooperative efforts other than to avoid being 
characterized as an impediment to progress. 
 
2.  Decisions and Actions 
Game outcomes are somewhat ambiguous in the absence of a natural 
disaster or terrorist event in which real responses and abilities can be measured.  
However there are several indicators that are not only indicative of the players’ 
motivations and positions, but also indicate that in Monterey County counter-
terrorism and emergency preparedness is in fact a bureaucratic political game 
structured in a way that makes cooperation possible.  As noted above, for 
practical purposes this game can be said to have started on September 11, 
2001.  Besides the national events of that date, a meeting of the Board of 
Supervisors, where they were discussing the events in New York and 
Washington, D. C., was cut short by a bomb threat.  This event reinforced the 
need for the County to take action, not only in support of the nation, but to ensure 
                                            
52 County of Monterey, (accessed). 
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that Monterey County was itself prepared for a terrorist attack.  The lack of a 
central executive precluded thee immediate reallocation of resources or the 
official assignment of an executive agency specifically to coordinate this 
response, as happened in the federal government.  However, even without the 
impetus of an executive, the response, coordinated in large part by OES was 
generally coherent and appropriate. 
Since 9/11, the Board of Supervisors has taken several actions and policy 
measures related to emergency services.  They have allocated funds to build a 
new, combined EOC and 911 Center, allowing these agencies to move out of the 
Courthouse basement to a modern facility closer to the County Information 
Technology (IT), communication, and engineering centers.53  They have also 
repeatedly provided additional funding to the 911 center to upgrade equipment, 
and significantly, recognized incoming federal and state grants to both the 
Emergency Communications Center and the Emergency Management Center as 
extra-budgetary income and appropriations which helped to prevent the 
reallocation of resources away from the programs the grants were intended to 
help.  The process of developing these grant proposals provides further 
examples of how interagency cooperation is developing in Monterey and is 
examined in detail in Chapter II. 
Both the Civil Grand Jury, in its 2002 report, and the Board of Supervisors 
in various documents recognize that the threat to Monterey County from 
terrorism is comparatively low and that the County would receive substantial 
assistance from the State and Federal Government in the event of a direct 
attack.54  More likely and therefore more important is the ability of the county to 
respond to the fringes of a crisis that spills over into the county.  In such a 
scenario, there would likely be little if any external support.   In keeping with 
these observations there has been no move by any senior player to reorganize 
                                            
53 New 911/Emergency Operations Center, (2003, accessed May 28 2003); available from 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/capitalprojects/911oes.html. 
54 County of Monterey, (accessed). 
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the County government to create a local counterpart to DHS, instead the 
emphasis has been to augment services that are already in place. 
The Civil Grand Jury, as would be expected, did put homeland security on 
their 2002 agenda, choosing to investigate the OES:  
This was motivated in part by a post-September 11, 2001, 
perceived need to assure that the County is organized to meet the 
demands which would be imposed on its resources should a 
disaster or a terrorist-like assault occur.55 
This investigation found that the County was “reasonably well-prepared” 
but would benefit from an increase in funding and staffing, a streamlining of the 
bureaucracy that has developed between OES, the CAO and the Board, as well 
as better participation from other agencies and NGOs in exercises.  The Board of 
Supervisors’ response to the Grand Jury report is more a reflection of the CAO’s 
position than that of the board, agreeing with the call for more active 
participation, but disagreeing with and not implementing the other suggestions.  
According the response, the situation of the OES “is not unique given the 
County’s current fiscal position.” Furthermore the recommendation for additional 
staff would “not be implemented because the County has many competing needs 
for staff resources.56  It is noteworthy that because of the significant budgetary 
issues throughout of the Civil Grand Jury report, and the  steep cuts  expected  in  
the upcoming budget, the responses to the CGJ report were drafted by the CAO 
budget office.57  These responses were approved without discussion by the 
Board.58   
This disagreement between the CAO and the Grand Jury highlights the 
ability of the CAO to influence the decision-making process through procedural 
control.  Had there been more public debate on the issue, or if it had been picked                                             
55 County of Monterey, (accessed). 
56 Response to Civil Grand Jury Report (Salinas: Monterey County Board of Supervisors, 
2003). 
57 Interview, Veronica Ferguson, Monterey County Office of Administration, May 12. 
58 Minutes Board of Supervisors, Tuesday March 18, 2003, (2003, accessed April 2003); 
available from http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/suagenda/past/2003/03-18-03M.htm. 
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up on by the press, the outcome might well have been different. While an 
increase in the OES staff would be beneficial, from the overall perspective of the 
CAO it is untenable givien the severe budget situation.  Her proposed budget for 
FY 2004 will reflect a 25% reduction in operating expenses and staff, and while 
she likely does not view the OES staff as protected from these cutbacks, the 
Board of Supervisors unofficially directed the CAO to explore “other options” to 
balance the budget than cutting public safety staff.59  The final budget proposal 
that was submitted to the Board of Supervisors protected key services and 
although public safety agencies are still facing cuts, they are generally less 
severe than in the rest of the government.60 
The acceptance by the CAO of the Civil Grand Jury’s recommendation to 
increase staff participation in OES training indicates a potential for improved 
interagency cooperation.  Even without an increase in staffing the OES may be 
able to further improve planning and training activities through increased 
participation.  Like the Board of Supervisors statement of principles this gives 
more weight to requests by the Emergency Services Manager for support from 
other agencies. 
D. CONCLUSION  
The minor structural and environmental differences noted in this case 
cannot by themselves account for the high level of cooperation in the Monterey 
County Emergency Management System, but they do indicate that a massive 
reorganization is not required in order to overcome the limitations to cooperation 
that are described by traditional bureaucratic theory.  Indeed a massive 
reorganization, such as the Goldwater-Nichols reformation of DoD and the 
current development of DHS, would likely do little to reduce barriers to 
cooperation.  The successes of these reorganization are more clearly evident in 
economies of scale and a streamlined bureaucratic process.    
                                            
59 Interview, Monterey County Official, Name Withheld, (2003). 
60 Joe Livernois, "County Faces Budget Cuts, Layoffs," Monterey County Herald, June 4, 
2003.  
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1.   Theoretical Application 
The response of the County Government in Monterey to the increased 
awareness of the threat of terrorism seems to demonstrate less bargaining and 
struggle between agencies than a traditional bureaucratic politics model, or the 
experience of the federal government, would indicate.  As the debate over 
staffing shows, the bureaucratic political process is still in place and agencies still 
act in consideration of their own interests.  However, the structure and process of 
the bureaucratic political game at in Monterey County have reduced the barriers 
to cooperation as indicated by the increased emphasis that homeland security 
issues have taken in various agencies, and the willingness of agencies to 
develop collaborative programs shows.  These differences, including the lack of a 
strong central executive, the presence of additional motivations to cooperate, and 
the significant overlap of goals and resources, do not by themselves account for 
the significant level of cooperation that has developed, but instead indicate a 
structure that allows for increased cooperation unlike many government 
structures that tend to stifle it.   This allows other factors that contribute to 
cooperation to have more influence on the willingness and ability of players to 
cooperate. 
 
2.   Practical Application 
Basic structural factors, such as the presence or lack of a central 
executive may be out of the control of the government in the short-term, but the 
effect of some environmental factors, like the severe budget crises faced by 
Monterey County, can be controlled.   In this case the limitations of the budget 
were addressed with a mix of typical bureaucratic bargaining and cooperative 
efforts to increase resource sharing as indicated by the Board of Supervisors 
directive to examine alternatives to staff cuts.   More importantly there are 
environmental factors that are fully within the control of the government and may 
have the largest effect on the development of cooperation.  In Monterey County, 
the adoption of guiding principles by the Board of Supervisors established 
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parameters that afforded other officials some protection if they chose to adopt 
cooperative strategies, offsetting institutional barriers to cooperation.   
This case supports several recommendations for local governments 
developing homeland security policy or wishing to improve interagency 
cooperation: 
· Establish a decision-making process that involves less arbitration 
by an executive agent and more peer-to-peer negotiation 
· Decrease institutional barriers to cooperation by protecting the 
resources saved through cooperation 
· Don’t impose regimes of communication and collaboration that stifle 
real cooperation 
Policies such as these cannot guarantee cooperation by any means but 
can help to set the conditions in which it can flourish in response to other 
influences.   
 
3.   Summary  
Bureaucratic politics theory, which typically used to describe the internal 
bargaining process by which national governments determine foreign policy is 
also useful for describing the structure of local governments.  In some cases, as 
in Monterey County, local governments have a significantly different structure 
when compared to the federal government.  These differences, including the lack 
of central executive arbitration in the bargaining process, different institutional 
motivations, a larger overlap of goals, and a decreased collective pool or 
resources may indicate conditions where cooperation is more likely to develop.  
In Monterey County, these conditions seem to have had such an impact, as 
evidenced by decisions by the county to protect homeland security grant money, 
and provide funding to build a consolidated emergency services center. 
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III. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY THEORY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the role of epistemic communities in the 
development of interagency cooperation in Monterey County emergency 
management.  Over the last decade, epistemic community theory has gained 
cachet for its ability to explain the development of international consensus and 
cooperation, particularly in the areas of arms control and environmental 
protection.  In general, epistemic community theory argues that networks of like-
minded professionals can influence decision-making across organizational 
boundaries.  The identification and analysis of these networks indicates where 
cooperation is more likely, and may also provide insight regarding how 
cooperation can be improved.  This chapter examines the applicability of 
epistemic community in a domestic, emergency management situation, by 
identifying and describing the group within the emergency management system 
of Monterey County that is responsible for the majority of cooperative efforts, and 
proposes ways to strengthen other such groups in ways that would improve 
cooperation.  During the course of this analysis it is shown that while it cannot be 
determined if this group fits the accepted definition of an epistemic community, it 
nevertheless behaves as an epistemic-like group and warrants further study for 
its role in the development of interagency cooperation. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The term epistemic community has been interpreted and defined in a 
number of ways, but the definition proposed by Peter Haas has been widely 
accepted.  According to Haas, “an epistemic community is a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or 
issue-area.”61  This is an expansion of earlier discussions of epistemic 
communities which considered only scientists or groups that followed the 
                                            
61 Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," p. 3. 
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scientific method.   Haas expanded on the definition by identifying characteristics 
of epistemic communities that differentiate them from professions, interest 
coalitions or advocacy groups: 
Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals 
from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a 
shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a 
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; 
(2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their 
domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the 
multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired 
outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity-that is, intersubjective, 
internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in 
the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise - 
that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems 
to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out 
of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence.62 
These four characteristics--shared normative beliefs, shared causal 
beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise--provide the 
basis for differentiating epistemic communities from other types of groups.  As 
Thomas notes, these other types of groups often reach very different conclusions 
from the same set of data, or hold similar positions on issues for a variety of 
reasons.  Members of an epistemic community, however, given a ambiguous set 
of data, would reach the same conclusions and for the same reasons.63  
Because an epistemic community has a claim to authoritative knowledge in a 
policy area, the members of a community often hold significant sway in policy 
decisions, and as Haas and others demonstrate, the commonalities among 
community members can be critical factors in the development of cooperation 
between organizations and government agencies.  
The presence and influence of an epistemic community can serve as a 
measurement of the willingness of a group of agencies, organizations or 
governments to cooperate with each other.  This chapter attempts to identify 
                                            
62 Ibid. 
63 Thomas: p. 223. 
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such a community within Monterey County ESM and to show how this community 
has improved cooperation.  The impact of an epistemic community should be 
seen in the decisions and actions that these organizations take.  Recent actions 
by county agencies in response to the various homeland security grant programs 
provide a unique opportunity to investigate this impact.  For example, the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) will provide over $150 million to first 
responders in California, but the request for proposals came with significant 
restrictions and a very short timeline.   These restrictions and time constraints 
made formulating a cooperative grant proposal extremely difficult.  The 
development of such a cooperative proposal, then, would be an indicator of a 
significant level of interagency cooperation within the county, and if an epistemic 
community was a component of this cooperation, it would likely play a significant 
role in the development of the proposal. 
In order to identify and examine this community, this chapter investigates 
the development and conduct of interagency organizations and processes, 
particularly as they apply to the State Homeland Security Grant Program.  It is 
shown that: 
· The grant proposal produced by Monterey County represents a 
significantly cooperative effort of the agencies involved. 
· This proposal was developed and approved because of the direct 
involvement of a small group of individuals who work together 
routinely. 
· The dynamics of the group responsible for this and other cooperative 
efforts, although it does not fit the strict definition of an epistemic 
community as described by Haas, nevertheless provides insight into 
the role of ideas in the development of cooperation.  
To verify these claims, a series of interviews were conducted with individuals 
identified as central figures in the development of emergency management policy 
and interagency cooperative efforts.  These interviews were compared with 
official records and observations of cooperative efforts and planning sessions. 
 
C.  CASE STUDY 
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There are several groups within the Monterey County Emergency 
Management System that share ideas at a professional level and influence policy 
decisions made by the OES or supporting agencies.  Among them are the 
Operational Area Coordinating Council (OACC), the Unified Public Safety Task 
Force, (UPSTF) the Monterey County Fire Chiefs’ Association, and the Monterey 
County Chief Law Enforcement Officers’ Association.  In addition to these groups 
there are a large number of professional organizations at the state and national 
level, which may have some impact on local policy, primarily through the 
development of “best practice” standards, but are often more concerned with 
representing the interests of their constituents to Congress and state legislatures.   
The local groups hold the most potential for finding a viable epistemic 
community.  The OACC is particularly interesting in that, while nominally 
mandated by the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), its 
organization and functions are determined by the participants, and decisions 
reached by the council are not binding on the county government or the 
participating agencies.64  The OACC was also the de facto forum for coordination 
of the SHSGP, and its members were intimately involved in several other 
interagency programs 
 
1.  The State Homeland Security Grant Program 
The State Homeland Security Grant Program of 2003 was announced by 
Secretary Ridge on March 07, 2003 as a means of providing funding to first 
responders throughout the Country.  Although a similar grant program was 
provided in 2002, this program gave State agencies little time to respond with 
grant proposals, and mandated specific allocations of funds for equipment, 
planning, training and exercises.  The SHSGP is divided into two parts, part I 
providing approximately $45 million in first responder funding to California, and 
                                            
64 Standardized Emergency Management System Guidelines, (California Office of 
Emergency Services, 1994, accessed May 2003); available from 
http://www.oes.ca.gov/oeshomep.nsf/all/SEMSGUIDE_pdfs. 
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part II over $103 million.65  The states were given some latitude in how the funds 
are to be distributed, and of these funds, the Monterey Operational Area (OA) is 
expected to receive about $1.5 million, provided the grants are approved.66 
The guidelines established by California mandated that each OA establish 
an approval authority for the grant proposal.  This board is comprised of five 
voting members, representing the County Health Department, County Fire 
Authority, the Sheriff, a municipal Fire Chief and a municipal Police Chief. This 
board must approve the grant proposal before the State Office of Homeland 
Security will accept it.  It is also important that Emergency Services Mangers 
were not included on this board, nor was the board empowered to manage the 
grant program after the proposal is submitted. 
Additionally, California mandated that fire, police and EMS agencies each 
receive a minimum of 20% of the funds.  This allocation could be overridden by 
agreement of four of the five voting members, but was established in order to 
balance the competing interests and unequal influence that these agencies 
typically have in the Operational Area structures throughout the state.  The 
program and guidelines were officially announced by the California Office of 
Homeland Security on April 14, 2003, and gave the County agencies only thirty 
days to form the approval authority and develop a joint proposal.67 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many OA’s struggled to develop the 
approval authorities, much less develop an acceptable proposal.  However in the 
Monterey OA, before the program had been officially announced by the State 
OES, the board had been formed and had agreed to a general framework for a 
proposal that would request funding for a multi-jurisdictional/multi-agency 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) capability 
and would require a redistribution of funds only possible with a 4/5th majority.68  
                                            
65 Department of Homeland Security Announces Funding for First Responders, [Press 
Release] (Department of Homeland Security, 2003, accessed May 2003); available from 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=500. 
66 Kevin Howe, "County Hopes for Security Grants," Monterey County Herald, May 3, 2003. 
67 Governor's Office of Emergency Services, (accessed). 
68 Minutes, Operational Area Coordination Council, April 11, 2003 (2003). 
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The proposal builds on existing hazardous materials capabilities in the Seaside 
and Salinas Fire Departments, and gives the vast majority of the funds to those 
departments.  What is most significant is that the representatives of the law 
enforcement and health agencies gave up a legitimate claim to 20% of the funds, 
and that the ultimate recipients of the grant had no direct representation on the 
Approval Authority.69 The ease with which this proposal was developed and 
approved indicates a higher level of cooperation in the Monterey OA than in other 
OA’s in California.   
 
2. The Monterey County Approval Authority 
 By the April 11, 2003 meeting of the OACC, the requirements for the 
SHSGP, although not officially released by the State OES, were known and the 
Approval Authority had already been established and met twice.  They reported 
to the OACC that meetings had been very productive and that “the money will be 
spent to benefit the entire county, [by developing] a multi-discipline combined 
response to [CBRNE threats].”70  The membership of the Approval Authority had 
been finalized at the first meeting. 
Two members of the five member board were required by the California 
guidelines to be chosen from among the local fire and police chiefs to represent 
the municipal interests.  While no method of selecting the members was 
specified, in Monterey the decision logically fell to the Chiefs’ Associations.  They 
selected Salinas Police Chief Daniel Ortega and Carmel Fire Protection District 
Chief Sidney Reade as their representatives.  Additionally, as there is no county 
fire department in Monterey, the chair of the Fire Chiefs’ Association, Pacific 
Grove Fire Chief Andrew Miller was designated to represent the county interests.   
The other two members of the board, as mandated by the State 
guidelines, were Sheriff Mike Kanalakis and Director of Health, Len Foster.  
                                            
69 Minutes, Homeland Security Approval Authority Meeting, May 7 2003 (Salinas, CA, 2003). 
70 Minutes, Operational Area Coordination Council, April 11, 2003.  Note that the term 
CBRNE was adopted later in this meeting to incorporate components of hazardous materials 
response, explosive ordnance disposal and environmental health. 
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Although the state guidelines deliberately left the Emergency Services Manager 
off of the board, the Monterey County Board decided to include Manager Harry 
Robins as a non-voting member and proxy voter if needed.  They also agreed 
that their recommendation would be subject to the approval of the entire 
OACC.71  The County Board of Supervisors also directed the OACC staff to 
manage the grant process.72   
The board met four times between its formation and the submission of the 
grant proposal, and between meetings coordinated with the individual agencies 
to prioritize the requirements for building a multi-agency CBRNE response.  The 
concept was to build on and combine the outdated hazardous material 
containment capabilities of the Seaside and Salinas Fire Departments.  Two 
teams would be created that would be mutually supportive and responsible for 
responding to CBRNE incidents throughout the county.  This required the 
agreement of all of the fire districts in order to develop the mutual aid agreements 
needed to make the concept work.  Additionally, in order to build even marginally 
effective teams, virtually all of the currently available money would be funneled to 
these two departments.  The requirements were prioritized to buy the most 
expensive equipment first, then to enhance the teams with additional equipment 
and training with additional grant money as it became available, either through 
subsequent SHSGP phases, or other, related grant programs.73    
While this proposal might be expected to generate opposition from the 
smaller fire districts, and from the health and law discipline representatives, this 
did not occur.  According to the members of Approval Authority, they supported 
the proposal for a number of reasons.  First, the Fire Chiefs of the smaller 
districts knew that they were not capable of maintaining an independent CBRNE 
response; in some cases this would more than double the current size of their 
departments.  If they were to have any CBRNE capability it would have to be 
under a mutual aid plan of some type.  Second, the health and law 
                                            
71 Interview, Carmel Fire Chief Sidney Reade, May 12, 2003, (Carmel: 2003). 
72 Minutes, Homeland Security Approval Authority Meeting, May 7 2003. 
73 Minutes, State Homeland Security Grant Program Approval Authority. (Salinas, 2003). 
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representatives understood the importance of developing a CBRNE capability 
and were willing to forgo their claim to the grant funds.  As other grant programs 
specifically targeted to their areas were also being announced, they chose to 
focus their grant efforts in these areas.  Finally, the members of the Approval 
Authority had worked together for many years, and developed a high level of 
trust with each other.  They were known to each other to be committed to 
developing cooperative programs and had a track record of supporting each 
other’s programs.  Most importantly, they shared an understanding of the limited 
resources available for the various program and that a multi-agency approach 
would be more effective.74  The conduct of this board and the long-term working 
relationships that have developed between many of its members highlight many 
of the characteristics of an epistemic community as proposed by Haas. 
 
3.   The Monterey Emergency Management Community 
As Haas indicates it might, the epistemic community at work in Monterey 
County Emergency Management represents various professions, including law 
enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, health services and emergency 
management professionals.  Members of these professions generally have 
different, if not conflicting mindsets, yet this particular group holds similar values 
and beliefs.  First, they value interagency cooperation as a means of achieving 
the 21st-century ideal of “doing more with less.”  Second, they have a dedication 
to community service that outweighs institutional motivations.  Third, they value 
effectiveness more importantly than tradition, so they have a greater acceptance 
of innovation.  Finally, there is a progressive viewpoint that fuels a desire for 
improvement, and looks for ways to apply new technology and ideas.   This 
community seems to have about twenty to thirty members in Monterey County; 
however, within this community is a core group of “interagency-ists” that are 
consistently found to be at the heart of interagency cooperative efforts.   
 
                                            
74 Interview, Carmel Fire Chief Sidney Reade, May 12, 2003., Interview, Monterey County 
Director of Health, Len Foster, May 20, (2003). 
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a.   Law Enforcement 
The typical law enforcement mindset is one of self-sufficiency, 
probably arising from the standard practice of sending police officers on patrol 
alone or with a single partner.  Law enforcement agencies are also relatively 
well-funded and seldom need to rely on other agencies to perform their core 
duties.  While they are often better prepared to take command of a scene or 
incident and make quick, tough decisions than their Fire Department 
counterparts, they are generally not as well trained to use the Incident Command 
System (ICS) and SEMS.  They are also less inclined to request mutual aid 
support from other agencies and disciplines, and are less likely to make specific 
requests when they do.75   
In some contrast to this mindset, Sheriff Mike Kanalakis, 
Commander Mike Brassfield, Chief Deputy John Calzada and Carmel Police 
Chief George Rawson have gained a reputation for approaching problems from 
an interagency perspective.  Throughout the county, public safety professionals 
and government officials mention their work on interagency efforts and their 
support of other departments’ programs.76  This approach is evident in their 
concept for the CBRNE capability being developed.  According to Commander 
Brassfield, while from an institutional perspective police would generally like to 
remain on the periphery of any hazardous materials area, they realize that now 
these areas are likely to be crime scenes and they will need to be prepared to 
operate in “hot” and “warm” zones for extended periods.  This is offset by the 
understanding that the Fire Departments will have a primary role in the response 
and  have more immediate  equipment  needs  than  the  police  forces  do.   The  
proposal calls for a balanced improvement of capability throughout the police, fire 
and health disciplines, with Fire Departments getting the bulk of the initial 
funds.77   
                                            
75 Interview, Commander Mike Brassfield, Monterey County Office of the Sheriff, May 16, 
(Salinas, CA: 2003).  This impression is supported by observations and conversations with a 
number of public safety professionals. 
76 Interview, Carmel Fire Chief Sidney Reade, May 12, 2003. 
77 Interview, Commander Mike Brassfield, Monterey County Office of the Sheriff, May 16. 
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Each of these professionals has been in law enforcement for over 
thirty years, almost exclusively with their current agencies.  Instead of developing 
stronger and stronger institutional views, as seems to be the case with many 
other senior public safety officials who have remained with the same agency, 
they have developed a strong interagency agenda.  At least for the members of 
the Sheriff’s Department, this approach developed in part over “years of eating 
lunch together” as they rose through the ranks, discussing the way things ought 
to be, then finding themselves in positions to make changes.  They attribute the 
current interagency successes in large part to like-minded people in other 
agencies who have also been promoted to positions of leadership and now have 




Unlike law enforcement agencies, fire fighters and departments are 
much more likely to work in teams, and to plan for mutual support among 
stations.   The nature of fire emergencies is one of infrequent response requiring 
substantial resources.  Although more prone to working together, the fire mindset 
is not one of innovation; sacred cows abound in the fire communities, such as the 
separation between paramedics and firemen. 
Chief Sidney Reade, on the other hand, is a known (and sometimes 
vilified) innovator.  Even before being named the Carmel Valley Fire District 
Chief, she was instrumental in consolidating emergency services in the area to 
form the district.  She was a founding member of the Uniform Public Safety Task 
Force (UPSTF) and the Tri-County Mutual Aid Committee (Tri-MAC), chairs the 
Monterey County Fire Chiefs’ Association, and is the lone fire representative on 
the Monterey County Chief Law Enforcement Officers’ Association (MCCLEOA). 
 
                                            
78 Ibid. 
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c.  Health and Medical Services 
Director of Health, Len Foster, is another thirty-year veteran in his 
field, having been the Directory of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in Orange 
County prior to arriving in Monterey in 2001.  As the Director of Health, Foster is 
responsible for all “pre-hospital” emergency medical care, coordinating and 
certifying the paramedic and ambulance response as well as certifying hospital 
emergency rooms to receive emergency medical patients.  In Monterey County 
emergency medical care is provided through a contract with American Medical 
Response.  Bringing a third viewpoint to the scene of an incident, emergency 
medical teams are more focused on, and better prepared to provide medical care 
to, the victims.  Because many firefighters are trained as Emergency Medical 
Technicians (EMT) and may be able to respond faster, emergency medical crews 
often take over or direct the care of a patient.  However, they are the least trained 
in the ICS and, because they are not public safety officials, would not be 
assigned as the Incident Commander. These factors have put emergency 
medical services and fire crews at odds in the past, and according to Foster, 
cooperation between emergency medical crews and other responders was less 
than ideal.79  
Cooperation between EMS, fire and law enforcement in Monterey 
has improved significantly since Foster’s arrival, largely because of his efforts.  
Shortly after his arrival he established the emergency medical services council 
with representatives of all of the stakeholders.  Participation in this group led to 
better personal relationships, and eventually to improved cooperation.  The white 
powder” events80 throughout the county in the fall of 2001 further increased 
cooperation and helped to highlight the need for a cooperative HazMat response 
                                            
79 Interview, Monterey County Director of Health, Len Foster, May 20. 
80 In the aftermath of the anthrax mail incidents on the East Coast, there were several 
reports of “suspicious white powder” received at the Monterey 911 center.  Each of these reports 
had to be considered a potential biological attack and required the response of emergency 
medical and hazardous materials teams.  The actual sources of the white powder were varied, 
including chalk used to mark race routes, flour spilt during delivery, and packaging powder used 
to collate mail inserts.  While no anthrax was found during any of the local events, the expense 
incurred through overtime, depletion of supplies and increase equipment maintenance was 
considerable. Interview, Monterey County Offices of Emergency Services Manager, Harry 
Robbins, February 27, (2003).   
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capability.  It not only challenged the ability of the various agencies to work 
together, but depleted resources of the responding agencies and uncovered a 
need to replace outdated equipment. 
 
4. Community Activities 
In addition to their work on the SHSGP proposal, this same core group 
has been involved in developing cooperative efforts among public safety 
agencies for several years.  Among the efforts in which this community has been 
involved are the integration of fire and emergency medical services in the Carmel 
area, the development of a county-wide CBRNE capability, the Unified Public 
Safety Task Force (UPSTF), and the Tri-county Mutual Assistance Committee. 
On the surface it seems redundant to have essentially the same group of people 
meeting in several different venues to discuss interagency cooperation.  
However, despite this seeming lack of efficiency, members of the core group 
claim that the various meetings allow them to focus on priorities as needed, and 
gain critical buy-in from their respective agencies that might otherwise be lacking.   
 
a.  CBRNE Capability Development 
The current SHSGP proposals are really only part of the 
interagency CBRNE capability development project that has grown over the past 
several years.   Beginning  in  1999,  representatives  of  the interested agencies,  
including all six of the core group, began to consider what the requirements for a 
WMD response would be, and submitted their first funding proposal just before 
the September 11th attacks. 
The post-9/11 environment significantly changed the funding 
environment for CBRNE-related activities, and what was a long-term, second-tier 
project got moved to the forefront throughout the nation.  The initial approach 
developed by the WMD group was to increase training and planning, and then to 
purchase equipment as more significant funds  became  available.   The  primary  
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focus of the various federal grant programs, however, has been to front-load 
equipment purchases, while providing relatively less funding for planning and 
training.   
Beginning with the first Federal grant program, the WMD group, 
which had been meeting on an informal basis, began to meet more often and on 
a more formal basis as a working group of the OACC.  They reprioritized funding 
requirements to fit into the grant programs while continuing to push for training 
and planning capabilities.  The announcement of the 2003 SHSGP requirements 
for a local approval authority was somewhat of a non-event for the county as the 
mandated and representative membership had already been meeting for over 
two years discussing the same topics. 
 
b. Unified Public Safety Task Force 
In the wake of the Columbine High School shootings in 1999, 
several studies were conducted investigating the emergency services response 
to the incident.  It was generally concluded that fire, police and ambulance crews 
responded to and managed the incident as three separate events.  Although the 
Incident Command System had been gaining acceptance prior to this tragedy, 
these reports, followed by several other incidences of school violence and 
compounded by the attacks of September 11th, gave renewed impetus to its 
implementation nationwide.  In Monterey, the fire and police chiefs’ associations 
decided to form the Unified Public Safety Task Force (UPSTF) to coordinate 
interagency planning and response.  UPSTF was formed as a working group 
under the OACC in 2001 and included representatives from the health 
department and emergency medical discipline as well as fire and law.  Sidney 
Reade, Mike Brassfield, Harry Robins and Len Foster were instrumental in 
getting UPSTF started and are current members.81 
 
                                            
81 Interview, Chief Deputy John Calzada, Monterey County Office of the Sheriff, May 16, 
(2003). 
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c. Tri-County Mutual Aide Committee 
The Tri-County Mutual Aide Committee (Tri-MAC) was originally 
proposed as the Tri-County Counter-Terrorism Task Force.  The name change 
itself, made at the insistence of Santa Cruz County representatives, indicates 
some of the challenges of developing cooperative efforts across operational 
areas.  While Monterey County is one of the wealthier and more conservative 
counties in California, San Benito is one of the poorest,82 and Santa Cruz County 
is one of the most liberal areas in the United States. Nevertheless, the 
emergency scenarios, from earthquakes and flooding to terrorist attacks, indicate 
that these three counties will be affected in similar ways; furthermore, these 
areas are likely to be somewhat ignored as state and federal resources flow into 
the larger metropolitan areas to the north.  The common view among members of 
the community is that coordinated effort will be critical to the successful mitigation 
of any significant event.83   
The Tri-MAC grew out of mutual aid commitments for firefighting 
resources that had been in place for many years, and took on new pertinence 
when representatives from the respective Sheriffs’ Departments, including 
Brassfield from Monterey, began to compare notes on the development of 
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams.  Prior to closing of Ft. Ord in 1991, 
the U. S. handled all of the EOD requirements in the county.  After this, the 
Sheriff Kanalakis, then a Commander recognized the cap in capabilities and 
began exploring potential solutions.  Realizing that much of the equipment used 
by EOD teams would be expensive and seldom used, the Sheriffs’ Departments 
agreed to coordinate purchases in order to maximize the total capability in the 
Tri-county region.  Because of the frequent contact between members of the core 
group they quickly realized that the cooperative efforts between the counties 
could be consolidated in much the same way as they had been internally.84  
                                            
82 By average income of employed workers, Monterey ranks 15 out of 59 counties, while San 
Benito is 59th, other comparisons are similar.  California State Association of Counties, About 
California Counties(2003, accessed April 2003); available from http://www.csac.counties.org. 
83 Interview, Commander Mike Brassfield, Monterey County Office of the Sheriff, May 16. 
84 Ibid. 
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The core group, along with their counter-parts in Santa Cruz and 
San Benito counties, began to develop a more comprehensive group of mutual 
aid plans and to present the concept to their respective agencies and Boards of 
Supervisors.  The concept of a tri-county response was underwritten by the 
participants of a “Homeland Security Summit” held at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in March of 2002.  As discussed in Chapter I, this meeting generally 
praised preparedness along the central coast, but also indicated that a regional 
approach would further enhance the capabilities.85 Currently, the Monterey 
County Board of Supervisors is considering a Memorandum of Agreement that 
would formally establish the Tri-MAC as a policy advisory panel to advise the 
county governments “on means to enhance mutual cooperation and coordination 
of mutual aid efforts and operations.”86 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The impact that the core group of “interagency-ists” have had on 
cooperation for homeland security preparedness in Monterey County is clearly 
evident.  Experts in all levels of government have concluded that ESM in 
Monterey is one of the best in the nation, and they have a clear workable plan for 
improving capabilities in many areas, including as shown here, CBRNE 
response.  This group has been involved in the development of these programs 
for several years, and was able to maximize the financial benefits provided by the 
SHSGP, fitting it directly into their plan rather than buying capabilities piece-meal 
as many governments are doing. 
 
1.   Theoretical Application 
What is not clearly evident, however, is that this group fits Haas’s strict 
definition of an epistemic community.  While they certainly share a belief system 
                                            
85 Moore. 
86 Although initially scheduled for a vote on May 27, 2003, approval of the memorandum as 
been delayed while the respective agencies sort out issued related to California’s Open Meeting 
Act.  A formal agreement forming the Tri-MAC might create an additional state-level government 
agency and could impede cooperation through bureaucratic overhead. 
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and a policy agenda, it is unclear whether this is derived from, as Haas 
describes, “their analysis of practices leading or contributed to a central set of 
problems in their domain”87, or if it is simply the result of their continued efforts to 
cooperate.  This distinction is often made in the literature to separate an 
epistemic community from a policy clique or coalition that comes together for a 
more limited purpose.  For the most part, the core group described here seems 
to have developed collectively, and may be lese coherent if there was more 
exchange and interaction with other groups that, on the surface, seem to hold 
similar views.  Conversely, ease and speed with which the Director of Health 
became a vital member of the group indicates that the group is more than a 
“policy clique” that has developed within the local government. 
In his 1990 book, When Knowledge is Power, Ernst Haas allowed for 
more flexibility in his definition of epistemic communities, than did Peter Haas in 
1992, saying not only that the accepted definitions “must be augmented, however 
to suit specific circumstances. . .” but also that to him, an epistemic community 
was “composed of professionals (usually recruited from several disciplines) who 
share a commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political 
values.”88  The group described here fits this definition better, regardless of the 
origin of their shared values.  It is difficult however to show that this group shares 
a common causal model.  Various members of the group did express similar 
views concerning the public safety threats faced by Monterey County.  After 
natural disasters, they are most concerned about the secondary and tertiary 
effects of a terrorist attack on the San Francisco metropolitan area to the north 
rather than a direct attack against a local target.  They also share views 
concerning the effectiveness of potential responses by various agencies to 
emergency situations as well as the appropriate roles for various levels of 
governments in emergency management.  However, as with their policy agenda, 
it is not clear when and how these view developed. 
                                            
87 Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," p.3. 
88 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. 
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It is perhaps important to note that the members of the group, to a large 
extent, view themselves as public safety officials, not just a member of their 
particular profession second.  This distinction is not prevalent among police 
officers and firefighters, who while they take pride in contributing to the public’s 
safety, draw their identity primarily from their uniform.  Members of this core 
group, were much more likely to use terms such as “public safety official,” 
“unified response,”  “we” and “team” than were other police officers and fight 
fighters consulted for this thesis who, regardless of rank or longevity, more often 
used terms like “police and fire,” or gave “us and them” contrasts. Even more 
important than determining if one can classify this group as an epistemic 
community however is to note the influence of a small group on institutional 
learning in a larger organization.  Without a doubt this group has had a long-term 
impact on homeland security policy along the Central Coast.  They have done 
this by producing incident response plans that require continual consultation and 
mutual aid; agreeing to organize capital expenditure to support the plans rather 
than along agency lines; and by developing standards, agreements and forums 
for interagency cooperation. 
In When Knowledge is Power, Ernst Haas included epistemic communities 
in a larger description of institutional learning he termed “managed 
interdependence” which he contrasted with “incremental growth” and “turbulent 
non-growth” as models of institutional change.  Haas claims that “managed 
interdependence” is preferable (although less likely) to the other models of 
change, especially in polarized and volatile environments. In his model of 
managed interdependence, epistemic communities are the favored means by 
which experts influence policy.  Although focused on the design of International 
Organizations, this framework provides useful insight into governmental change 
at the local level as well.  For example his model of managed interdependence, 
although  developed  to describe  international  organizations,  shows  that  these  
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organizations tend to recruit and promote primarily on merit, have greater levels 
of interaction with NGOs, and exhibit other characteristics that would be 
described as “good government.”89   
When combined with the organizational analysis in Chapter 1, this 
examination of the impact of a community of interagency-ists provides a more 
thorough understanding of how interagency cooperation can develop.  While the 
structure of a government may provide opportunities for cooperation to develop, 
it may not do so in the absence of a group within the various governmental 
agencies that is both committed to similar policy objectives, and has the influence 
needed to get such policies adopted.   Even with such a group there are real, 
often technical limitations to how effective cooperative efforts can be – these are 
addressed in Chapter IV. 
 
2.   Practical Application 
While is it outside the scope of this thesis to test for the presence of other 
features of managed interdependence in Monterey County, the presence of an 
effective community of public safety experts (whether or not it meets a strict 
definition of an epistemic community) is an example of good government that 
should be recognized and encouraged.  Throughout the interviews, members of 
the core group stressed the need for continual work to enhance and maintain the 
level of cooperation that has developed.  This study indicates three policy 
recommendations for local governments wishing to foster interagency 
cooperation: first, the members of an existing community must continue to 
develop cooperative efforts; second, they must individually work to get these 
efforts adopted by their respective agencies; finally, they need to work to expand 
the community, if only to develop their eventual replacements.     
a.   Foster Cooperation within the Community 
In this case, continued development of cooperation within the 
community is the least of the concerns.  All the members interviewed indicated a 
strong personal relationship with the other members and exhibited a significant 
                                            
89 Ibid. 
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level of trust that they shared similar views and goals.  Several mentioned the 
various meetings at which the members attended and indicated that these 
meetings serve to reinforce their shared values and strengthen the community as 
a whole.  In particular, planning meetings such as the ones held prior to the 
announcement of the SHSGP give them the ability to discuss concepts and 
priorities and to develop long-range master plans.  There is little that needs to be 
or can be done at this time to foster this type of cooperation, but there are ways 
to hinder it that should be avoided.  As discussed in Chapter II, the structure of 
Emergency Management in Monterey County is conducive to cooperation within 
the group.  The heads of the various emergency response agencies have a large 
amount of flexibility to coordinate with their counterparts to develop cooperative 
plans and training.  An alternative environment that encouraged stovepipes of 
information and a “chain-of-command” approach to coordination would hinder 
cooperation within the community. 
 
b.  Adopt Cooperation as Policy 
Encouraging real cooperation between their respective agencies is 
one of the primary objectives of the core group.  A common sentiment expressed 
in the interviews was the continuing “need to change a lot of minds” within their 
own professions concerning the need and benefits of cooperation.  Changing 
minds in Monterey County is being accomplished by both policy and placement. 
Because members of the core group are now largely in senior 
positions, they often have the ability to adopt, or at least recommend, policy.  
They are able to establish policies that encourage cooperation.  For example, 
largely as a money-saving measure, the Sheriff is considering closing two 
substations in the Carmel area that are used by deputies for administrative 
support.  The cooperative solution to this loss of resources is to co-locate of the 
substations with one of the local fire stations, allowing them to share resources.  
The added benefit is that more firefighters and deputies are exposed to the daily 
operations of the other agency.   During  a  trial of the idea, a simple but poignant  
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example of cooperation arose, when without a second thought a deputy 
answered a ringing phone,  “Carmel Valley Fire Department, Deputy [Jones] 
speaking.”90   
Another key to getting cooperative efforts adopted was expressed 
in a number of interviews as “putting the right person in the right job.”  There is 
widespread agreement that cooperation is to a large degree dependent on 
personality, and that having the wrong person in a job will significantly hinder 
cooperative efforts.   
 
c. Foster Growth of the Community  
Growing the community itself is an issue related to but separate 
from fostering cooperation.  Growing the community goes beyond getting 
agencies to accept interagency cooperation as a necessary way of doing 
business; it is the development of interagency-ists who look and work for 
opportunities to cooperate.  Three methods of growing the community -- 
conversion, grooming and training -- should be continued and where possible 
expanded.   
Several members of the core group mentioned the process of 
getting others “on board” with the cooperative mindset.  One of members of core 
group was referred to as a “tough case,” who, after considerable effort, adopted 
the viewpoint of group and since has been instrumental in a number of 
agreements.  These type of comments indicate not only that the members of the 
core group view themselves as a community, but also are actively seeking to 
expand the group.  Furthermore, while many of them developed their shared 
value system over a period of time, they are also willing to accept “converts” as 
vital members of the community.  Other members of the group indicated that they 
are “grooming” younger members of their organizations to be interagency-ists by 
repeatedly assigning them duties that require extensive coordination with other 
agencies.  They feel that such experiences help to develop a greater 
appreciation for the capabilities and resources available from other agencies.  
                                            
90 Interview, Carmel Fire Chief Sidney Reade, May 12, 2003. 
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The continual influx of new members, and their exposure to new situations, also 
helps to curb the development of “groupthink” by encouraging the exchange and 
development of new ideas. 
 
3.   Summary  
Epistemic community theory describes the development of cooperation as 
the result of a distinct group of professionals that share common values, beliefs 
and policy goals.  Typically it is used to describe the development of cooperative 
efforts between national governments or between widely divided agencies within 
a government.  This chapter examined the usefulness of theory to describe the 
development of cooperation in the Monterey County Emergency Management 
System and found that while the group described here does not fit a strict 
definition of an epistemic community, it does function similarly as those described 
in other cases.  Furthermore this epistemic community-like group of “interagency-
ists” has played a very important role in the development of interagency 
cooperation in Monterey County, playing an integral role the development of a 
unified CBRNE capability and maximizing the benefit of the State Homeland 
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IV.  NETWORK THEORY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In their book Networks and Netwars, Arquilla & Ronfeldt delineated 
several recurring themes in the discussions and debates of the information age.  
Among them is the notion that the information revolution is as much about 
organization as about technology.   Their view is that information technology 
“favors and strengthens network organizations” over hierarchical organizations.91  
This view is promoted by those favoring military transformation in anticipation of 
new modes of conflict that increasingly focus on cyber and information 
dominance.  Despite the influence of network theorists such as Arquilla the 
massive reorganization undertaken in the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security shows that a hierarchical bureaucracy model still dominates 
within the federal government.    
However, at the local level, such a clear hierarchical order does not exist.  
First, local governments often have overlapping jurisdictions in a crisis situation.  
Second, as discussed in Chapter II, local governments often do not have a 
dominant executive branch; in Monterey County, for example, executive power is 
divided between the Board of Supervisors and the County Administrative Officer.  
Finally, a large portion of public safety and emergency response activities are 
carried out by government agencies external to county authority, the private 
sector, or non-governmental organizations.  To what extent, then, might a 
network model be used to describe the interagency process of the emergency 
management system at the local level?   Does such a model indicate ways to 
improve cooperation?  In answering such questions, others must be addressed 
as well, in order to more clearly define a network model of local interagency 
coordination.  What are the comparative advantages of networks and 
hierarchies?  Does this translate into a real advantage for networks over 
hierarchies?   
                                            
91 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars : The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, 
p. 5. 
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This chapter explores these questions in the context of an examination of 
the roles and potential roles for information technology in the Monterey County 
response to homeland security crisis situations such as a terrorist attack or 
natural disaster.  This chapter will consist of four parts:  The development of a 
network model for interagency cooperation for organizations in a homeland 
security environment; a description the Monterey County Emergency 
Management System (ESMS); a description of the information architecture of the 
ESMS; and an evaluation of current technologies that could be used or adapted 
to improve cooperation.    
 
B. METHODOLOGY  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s discussion of network organizations builds on the 
organizational models of Evans who described the ways in which information is 
exchanged between independent organizations.  In Evans’ models, network 
nodes have autonomy of decision, but are interdependent – the decisions of one 
node affect the decision-making process and utility of the others.  The network 
organizations that Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe retain this non-hierarchical 
aspect in that no node has decision-making authority over another.   However, 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s description of networks includes the possibility that an 
individual node in a network may represent an organization that is itself 
hierarchical.  Therefore, in order to examine the relative strengths of hierarchies 
and networks and to further examine the impact of information technologies, it is 
useful to establish ideal-types of network and hierarchical organizations.92 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt and other authors describe various types of network 
models. Hub-and-spoke networks most closely resemble government hierarchies 
in that communication links are focused on hub nodes that then direct information 
to other nodes that have fewer links.  Chains are another common model, in 
which any single node can only communicate with a relatively few other nodes 
and information must relayed over several nodes to get to its intended recipient.  
                                            
92 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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This type of network often develops in military and intelligence settings, where 
communication stovepipes are enforced, creating a chain of nodes prior to 
information reaching a hub.  An interesting recent development in network theory 
is the scale-free model, where there are no (or few) limits to the number of links a 
single node can have, and links develop naturally between the most efficient 
nodes.  This tends to clump channels of communication together, while leaving 
some nodes completely disconnected – another accurate depiction of what 
occasionally happens in government.  Throughout the “netwar” literature, 
however, is the all-channel network where all nodes have decision-making 
autonomy and are able to communicate to all other nodes in the network.  This is 
clearly the ideal-type.93   
The antithesis of this network, the ideal-type hierarchy, is the organization 
where both communication and decision-making are channeled so that a single 
node only communicates with the node directly above and those nodes directly 
below, and decision-making autonomy is centralized at a node common to those 
nodes affected by the decision.  A basketball team is representative of an ideal-
type network organization, whereas strict military-style chain-of-command is the 
classical example of an ideal-type hierarchy. 
By establishing these ideal-types, the relative strengths of the 
organizational type become more apparent.  Lawrence and Lorsch reference 
work by Leavitt in the relative ability of groups to solve problems when organized 
similarly to these ideal-types.  While the hierarchy was much better at efficiently 
solving recurring, similar problems, the network was better at adapting to new 
situations and generated a higher level of loyalty and morale.94  Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt make similar observations, noting that the ideal-type network 
organization has “high potential for collaborative undertakings.”95  Conversely, 
                                            
93 Ibid. 
94 Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing 
Differentiation and Integration (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969). 
95 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars : The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, 
p. 9. 
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the hierarchy benefits by reducing duplication of effort and the potential for 
decisions that are counterproductive to the organization as a whole.  The 
essential tradeoff, then, is efficiency for adaptability. 
How then does the use of information technologies affect the ideal-type 
organization?  The transforming ability of information technology is to provide 
more information to more people, faster.  While information technology can 
provide the centralized decision-makers in a hierarchical organization with better 
information to make better decisions, it also creates the potential for information 
overload.  Furthermore, additional information does little to increase the flexibility 
and adaptability of a hierarchy.  The benefits that a network organization receives 
from information technology are more apparent and direct.  A network can 
increase its efficiency through the use of IT because decentralized decision-
makers can be better informed about other decisions that affect them and how 
their decisions might affect others.  This reflects a central argument of network-
centric proponents -- that advances in information technology allow networks to 
overcome the inefficiencies of duplication and incoherence associated with the 
organizational model.  Conversely, while hierarchies benefit from increased 
efficiency through information technology, it does nothing to make them more 
adaptable.   Technology affects primarily the ability of an organization to 
cooperate; it does not provide an indication of an organization’s motivation or 
acceptance of cooperation.  Arquilla recognizes this limitation of network theory, 
noting that the effectiveness of a network organization is predicated by “the 
existence of shared principles, interests, and goals.”96 
This network theory of cooperation therefore consists of three fundamental 
hypotheses:   
· A network organization is inherently less efficient but more adaptable 
than a hierarchical organization.   
· The network architecture of an organization is indicative of the ability of 
an organization to cooperate 
                                            
96 Ibid. 
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· Improvements to the network architecture, including possible 
improvements that are achievable in the near-term, foster cooperation 
by allowing policy makers to consider cooperative alternatives to 
issues concerning the division of labor and resources. 
 
A theory of network cooperation, however, should be useful for an 
evaluation of real-world organizations, not just ideal-types.  Real-world 
organizations are a mix of networks and hierarchy, and the impact of information 
technologies is not as clear as it might be with ideal types.  An analysis of the 
decision-making structure of an organization, as well as the uses of information 
technologies, provides a means for application of the theory.  Furthermore, in an 
area such as homeland security, the “organization” that must be evaluated 
encompasses more than just the responsible government agency, but must also 
include those other agencies and non-governmental organizations that contribute 
to the process.  The process of information exchange between these diverse 
elements of the organizations must be evaluated as a single architecture, 
including both high- and low-tech solutions.   Overlaying this information 
architecture on the organizational structure provides an indication of which parts 
of the organization are either more networked or more hierarchical.    
 
C. CASE STUDY 
 
1. The Monterey Emergency Management Network 
Most organizations, including the Monterey County Emergency Services 
Management System (ESMS), are depicted as hierarchies, even when in reality 
the lines of authority and communication bear little resemblance to the 
organizational chart.  The ESM organization chart published in the County 
Emergency Operations plan depicts a typical hierarchical government 
organization with the various sub-units (fire, law, engineering, etc) reporting 
through the EOC to the CAO.  However, the real hierarchy of the ESMS exists 
only between the County Board of Supervisors, the CAO, the Emergency 
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Services Manager and the heads of the operations, planning, logistics and 
administration sections.  The remainder of the chart reflects those government 
organizations that must function during an emergency and some standard lines 
of coordination within the ESMS.97  
For most county agencies depicted on the chart, the lines of authority 
continue through their own departments to the Board of Supervisors.  In some 
cases, such as portions of the Law Enforcement and Search and Rescue units, 
command authority runs through the Sheriff’s Department to the Sheriff – an 
elected position in Monterey County and only partially subject to the authority of 
the Board of Supervisors.  Additionally, a significant part of the county-wide 
response to a crisis are not part of county government at all, such as the 
California Highway Patrol, military, federal, state and city agencies, and NGOs 
like the Red Cross or Pacific Gas & Electric.98 
The basis of the organizational chart, then, is not the lines of authority, but 
the lines of coordination and cooperation that have developed over time.   
Furthermore, the chart reflects only that portion of the Emergency Management 
System that makes up the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  The 911 / 
dispatch system and the field responders are two other major components of the 
ESMS that must also be considered.  An overview of the functions of each 
component during a crisis provides a better understanding of the organization 
than a simple wire diagram.   
911 is typically the first organization that coordinates the county response 
to a crisis situation.  They are responsible for dispatching the majority of field 
response units, for alerting and transferring calls to other dispatch centers, and 
for notifying the EOC staff when needed.  911 directs the initial allocation of 
resources based on predetermined criteria and facilitates communication 
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98 Interview, Monterey County Offices of Emergency Services Manager, Harry Robbins, 
February 27. 
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between field response units.   In Monterey County there are two separate 911 
call centers; the primary in Salinas, and a smaller center in Monterey.  
Additionally, 911 calls may be routed to dispatch centers for the California 
Department of Fire Protection or other dispatching agencies depending on the 
nature of the call.99 
The Emergency Operation Center, located next door to the main 911 
center, is not fully staffed at all times but becomes operational based on the size 
and scope of the emergency situation.  The organizational chart described above 
reflects most of the positions that can be activated in the EOC and how these 
positions are organized.  The primary purpose of the EOC is to coordinate the 
county-wide response to a crisis by allocating resources and de-conflicting the 
activities of the various agencies and NGOs involved.   
When activated the EOC is typically staffed with representatives, but not 
directors, of the various county agencies, other governments and NGOs.  The 
“Commander” of the EOC (either the County Administrative Officer, or the 
Emergency Services Manager) controls the operations within the EOC itself, but 
often does not have the authority to direct the response provided by an agency 
represented in the EOC.  In addition to coordinating the contribution of the 
various agencies and NGOs to the county response and providing direction and 
de-confliction for field response teams, the EOC serves as a focal point for 
cooperation between the county and non-county government agencies that might 
be affected by the crisis, including cities within the county, federal facilities 
located within the county, neighboring county EOCs and the California State 
EOC.100 
At the field response level, actions of the various agencies are coordinated 
by an Incident Commander, and who becomes the Incident Commander is 
determined based on the type of incident and what units are available to respond 
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first.  The Incident Commander has authority for the activities at the scene but 
does not control the allocation of resources to the incident, and primarily serves 
to de-conflict the activities of the various responders once they arrive.   Except 
when controlling those units from his own agency, the Incident Commander 
typically has the authority to request or forbid other responding units from 
conducting a particular activity, but he is not the commander in a traditional, 
military sense.  In practice, however, incident response in the field is usually 
coordinated by consensus with the Incident Commander, usually a law 
enforcement officer or a member of the Fire Department serving as the primary 
link between field response teams and the Emergency Operations Center.   
The Monterey County ESMS therefore can be described as more closely 
resembling the ideal-type network organization than the ideal-type hierarchy.  
Each major component of the county response--the 911/dispatch system, the 
EOC, and the field response team--is a node in the ESM network, and is also a 
separate network organization itself.  Following the network model of cooperation 
developed earlier, an analysis of the ability to share information between and 
within these components provides a measure of the ESMS’s ability to cooperate. 
2. The Information Architecture of ESM 
The information architecture of ESM consists of multiple, integrated 
systems for communication, coordination and information exchange.  This 
system is fairly robust, relying on redundant equipment, generators and multiple 
links to maintain communication during a crisis in a variety of environments.  
Some of the systems do have single points of failure, such as the reliance on 
remote antennas for radio links.  This system, like the vast majority information 
systems in use throughout the world, has developed in fits and starts over time 
and cannot be described as following any clearly defined master design or plan.   
Rattray proposes a taxonomy that identifies four basic components of an 
information infrastructure: 1) its physical components, 2) the software and 
standards that are used to manipulate information, 3) the information itself, and 
4) the people responsible for creating and maintaining the systems and training 
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the users.101   Using Rattray’s taxonomy as a guide it is possible to describe the 
information architecture of the ESMS – for clarity here they are grouped by major 
component (911/dispatch, EOC and field response) and primary use.  Of primary 
concern in this examination is the identification of those aspects of the 
information infrastructure that have the most direct impact on cooperation, either 
through facilitating or hindering communication. 
a. The Emergency Operations Center 
 THE EOC itself has been developed as a type of information 
network - each person working in the EOC is a separate node that communicates 
the capabilities, requirements and status of the agency that they represent to the 
other representatives in the room.  Internal to the EOC there are wall maps, 
status boards and a computer-based mapping tool that the staff uses to 
coordinate their information.  However, because the EOC staff only represents 
the agencies, they seldom have either decision authority or the ability to carry out 
decisions.   For any real cooperative effort to develop out of the EOC, these staff 
members must be able to communicate effectively with the agencies that they 
represent.  The primary means of communication established for this is a 
telephone installed at each station within the EOC, supported by a Private 
Branch Exchange (PBX) telephone system with 75 external lines and four fax 
machines.  Additionally there are five shared computers with internet access, 
with an email account established for each position and about 10 available Local 
Area Network (LAN) connections for EOC staff members to use with laptops from 
their agencies when the EOC becomes operational.  There are no unique 
software or protocols that are needed to support these systems, nor any 
personnel requirements above the County IT specialist that maintains all of the 
computers in the building.102   
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The PBX telephone system also serves as the primary means of 
voice communication between emergency management systems throughout the 
state.  A secondary system is the Operational Satellite Information System 
(OASIS) which consists of single voice/data-capable dedicated satellite radio in 
the EOC.  For voice communication between local EOCs, a separate radio, 
operating in the 150mhz range, is also available.  This radio net has 
approximately 50 nodes including all municipal EOCs, EOCs in neighboring 
counties, and several local response centers.  These systems require no specific 
protocols or support.  A backup to these systems is the radio network maintained 
by the Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES).  This network consists of 
shortwave radio sets installed in EOCs and other response centers.  The ARES 
network is capable of both voice and text communication and is maintained by a 
volunteer group.103 
Inter-EOC communication is also supported by the state-sponsored 
Response Information Management System (RIMS) and Emergency Digital 
Information System (EDIS).  In the EOC the RIMS system uses the five EOC 
computers and an additional three used by the permanent OES staff.  These 
computers require either an internet connection or a connection through the 
OASIS radio system to a central RIMS server.  A local RIMS server is also 
hosted on the OES web server.  RIMS supports the Standardized Emergency 
Management System message format and requires a local license of Lotus 
Notes™ for use.  While significant amount of training is required for effective use; 
such training is available on-line from the California OES website.  This system 
ensures a standardized format for emergency messages throughout the state, 
however, the information is primarily text-based, which many users see as a 
drawback.  Most users would prefer a graphical, and when possible, map-based 
presentation of data in order to quickly apply new information to the situation.104  
The EDIS system is an internet-based messaging system, using restricted-
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access inputs from multiple state and local sources.  The output messages are 
programmable by the receivers, can be tailored to provide information based on 
location and priority, and can be broadcast via email or text messaging over cell-
phone or pager.  The end user requires internet access for entering messages 
and for programming the service in addition to a receiving device.   The training 
is insignificant for the end user and the system is maintained by the State OES at 
no cost to the County.105 
The OES maintains a server separate from the primary servers for 
the county government.  Two computers are dedicated as servers, allowing for 
continuous availability.  The servers are connected to the main county IT center 
via county-owned data lines.  The EOC does not maintain a modem pool or have 
a secondary connection to the internet backbone.  The server hosts a local 
domain controller, a RIMS server that manages the connection of RIMS users to 
the California state server, and a web server for the publication of Emergency 
Bulletins during a crisis.  The email server for the EOC is located in the main IT 
center and is not maintained by the EOC staff.  The EOC server is maintained by 
building IT staff and permanent OES staff members have been trained to publish 
Emergency Bulletins to the web server.106 
Between the EOC and field response units, communication is 
maintained by cell phone and radio.  In addition to the cell phones maintained by 
most field response units, the EOC maintains a pool of 25 phones that can be 
activated and distributed as need.  However, while electricity will be maintained 
in the EOC by generators, the availability of cell-phone systems during a crisis is 
uncertain; therefore the primary means of communication is expected to be radio.  
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Remote radio transceivers located in the EOC are available for voice 
communication on the Law and Fire Radio nets used by 911/dispatch as well as 
for an 800 Mhz radio net that links medical centers. 107 
b. 911/Dispatach 
The main 911 center, located next door to the EOC, consists of 
eleven multi-purpose call center terminals that can be used to field 911 calls  and 
coordinate with other 911 and dispatch centers or direct field units.  The alternate 
center in Monterey has an additional six terminals. Each terminal consists of a 
computer terminal and a console that controls the radio and telephone 
connections.  The telephone system is a configurable multi-line system that will 
automatically route calls to the alternate center and then queue the calls once 
capacity is reached.  The main 911 center is the primary location for all 911 calls, 
but calls may be routed to separate dispatch facilities operated by military fire 
stations, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF), or the 
American Medical Response Paramedic Service.  The California Warning and 
Alert System and National Warning and Alert System (CAWAS/NAWAS) provide 
natural disaster and crisis information to the 911 call center over a dedicated 
telephone line system.108   
The computer terminals are linked to a central database of phone 
listings and map data that ties an incoming call to an address and location on the 
section map.  The call center operator enters additional information into the 
computer log concerning the nature of the call and the units responding as the 
incident progresses.  This database log is accessible via internet protocols from 
remote monitoring terminals in the 911 center, as well as police, fire and 
ambulance stations.  The log information is also transmitted over the California 
Law Enforcement Teletype System (CLETS) directly to responding units either at  
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the station, or vehicles equipped with a mobile CLETS terminal.  The 911 call 
centers require significant training and maintenance, which is a major function of 
the 911 staff.109  
The primary means of communication with field response units is 
150 Mhz radio.  Remotely mounted antennas on Mt. Toro provide line-of-sight 
coverage to all the population centers in Monterey County and the majority of the 
wilderness areas as well.  The dispatch radio system consists of three primary 
fire/rescue frequencies, one primary law enforcement frequency and a point-to-
point addressable radio system for law enforcement use.  In addition, 911 
dispatchers can monitor the OASIS and CALCOORD radio networks.110 
c. First and Field Response Units 
The information architecture to support cooperation among the field 
response teams is by far the least robust.  Links between field response teams to 
the EOC and 911/dispatch system have been discussed above and there is 
virtually no additional hardware that is used exclusively for intra-team 
coordination.  In some cases field response teams have Global Positioning 
System (GPS) receivers that are used to coordinate locations, but GPS is not 
used as an integrated system and map data and reference protocols have not 
been established.  The primary means of communication is via cell phone or 
portable radio, over a dedicated frequency in the 150 Mhz band referred to as 
CALCOORD, or the California Coordination net.  The dedication of this frequency 
is significant, however, in that it assures at least a minimal capability for on-site 
coordination by field response units.  Although the 911 center has the ability to 
monitor this frequency, they are restricted from broadcasting on it unless other 
means become unavailable.111  
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3. Potential Improvements to the Information Architecture 
Many systems are being considered by (or marketed to) various agencies 
for improvement to this infrastructure.  Often more important than the technology 
required to implement such improvement is the relationship the new capabilities 
have to development of cooperation.  For example, the development of a multi-
agency CBRNE response as described in Chapter III would likely not have been 
considered without the potential to send a deploying unit real-time updates, 
including graphical data, and initial sampling results.  This gives the unit the 
ability to conduct planning while responding from a more distant location, an 
important concept in the development of the capability.   
Systems available now and in the near future will let policy-makers and 
planners consider a wider-range of potential solutions to incident response and 
management, giving them the flexibility to choose more cooperative approaches.  
The systems that are likely to influence cooperative efforts can be categorized as 
Communication systems, Geographic Information Systems, or Response 
Management Systems, although many of the products being marketed to 
emergency management organizations integrate several systems.  The systems 
examined in this chapter are under consideration by various agencies within 
Monterey and the potential to significantly improve the ability of the agencies to 
cooperate at relatively low cost. 
a. Communication Systems  
While there has been significant emphasis on improving 
communication links among field response teams, real progress has been seen 
more in the areas of organization and training than in technological 
improvements.  Reserved frequencies for field coordination like the CALCOORD 
system described above have become more widespread, and the number and 
range of radios in the field has increased.  Additionally, systems have been 
developed to overcome the difficulties associated with radio frequency 
communications in typically poor quality environments such as heavily built up 
areas.  One such system, the “First Responder” produced by Raytheon and JPS 
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Communications, is a vehicle-mounted or transportable system that provides the 
Incident Commander with frequency-optimized radio and cell phone antennas, 
the ability to patch and link multiple communication channels, and a wireless 
access point for Internet protocol communications.  When multiple systems are 
used, the manufacturers claim vastly improved communication capabilities in 
even the worst radio frequency environments.112 
b. Geographic Information System (GIS) 
GIS is simple a group of computer systems “capable of assembling, 
storing, manipulating, and displaying geographically referenced information.”113  
It also encompasses a suite of protocols designed to facilitate the transfer of map 
and location data between multiple systems and users.  While GIS has been 
widely used by the military for several years and the United States Geological 
Survey has established a “National Spatial Data Infrastructure” to support the use 
of GIS, they have not been widely available for use in emergency response due 
to the high cost of the systems,  The Monterey OES has a GIS system located in 
the EOC, but it has little ability to exchange data with systems in other agencies 
or the field.  Several systems are now available that integrate GIS capabilities 
with a GPS and a communication device to provide real-time information 
exchange between a field response team and a central server.  Other systems 
can be integrated with the 911 system to provide a “reverse 911” system.  
Whereas in the current system a caller is identified by location, reverse systems 
can be used to notify all phone customers within a given area of critical 
information concerning evacuations or hazards.   
c. Response Management Systems 
 Response management systems often integrate improved 
communication and GIS systems into a package designed for use in EOCs.  
They typically have modeling software to help predict effects of developing 
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situations, and have messaging or computer network-based data sharing to allow 
multiple input and retrieval from databases.  These tools are often designed to 
speed the assessment process, allowing for a faster and more appropriate 
response to a situation.  The Consequences Assessment Tool Set (CATS) is one 
package that was initially developed for military use that has been expanded for 
use in homeland security.   CATS runs on a standard PC with a GIS system and 
is capable of integrating real-time weather and seismic data and accepting data 
from field-based systems over Internet protocols.  It allows an EOC to make 
casualty and damage predictions, identify at-risk areas and populations, and 
manage evacuation or relief efforts.114  In general such systems are designed to 
automate much of the work that EOC staff do manually, potentially reducing the 
manning and life-support requirements for an EOC during a crises.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The information architecture surveyed here indicates several areas where 
an inability to share information may limit the ESMS’s ability to cooperate, but 
also gives an indication of the potential improvements that are being considered 
by policy-makers and have influenced their decisions to adopt plans that call for 
increased cooperation.   For example, the inability to accurately exchange map 
and location data within field response units and from field response units to the 
EOC or 911 delays their response time, and the forced reliance on telephones as 
the primary or sole means on communication between the EOC staff and their 
respective agencies can result in the significant misallocation of resources.  
Nevertheless, because of the likely gains in these areas as a result of the 
deployment of GIS systems, response plans such as the interagency CBRNE 
response can and are being considered. 
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1.   Theoretical Application 
The network model developed here cannot be used to asses the 
willingness or motivation for an interagency emergency management 
organization to cooperation and coordinate.  However it does provide a valuable 
tool for analyzing the ability of an organization to do so. A network model 
provides a basis for evaluating the impact of infrastructure improvements on the 
ability of the organization to cooperate.   While there is a tendency in much of the 
popular as well as some technical literature to treat information technologies as a 
panacea against failures in interagency cooperation; improvements of 
information architectures can do little to foster cooperation if structural barriers 
exist or a group of interagency-oriented policy-makers does not. 
 
2.   Practical Application 
Some of the systems highlighted in the previous section provide a 
substantial increase to the infrastructure in areas that already support effective 
cooperation, while others much more effectively target areas where an 
infrastructure improvement would likely bring a substantial improvement in 
cooperation.  Because of the large wilderness areas and rough terrain in 
Monterey County, systems that allow for the collection, sharing and use of GIS 
data would probably have the greatest impact on the ability of the various 
agencies to improve coordination.  While improvement in the information 
architecture will not, by itself, improve the level or quality of interagency 
cooperation this network model does suggestion some policy recommendations 
that would help to maximize the benefit of such improvements: 
· Examine (and if warranted modify) the structure of the ESM 
network to pair decision-making authority with information 
availability. 
· Target architecture improvements towards providing more accurate 
and timely information to field response units and critical decision 
nodes. 




3.   Summary 
Network theory is used to describe a variety of systems, including social 
organizations and information exchange.  The chapter shows that it can be a 
useful tool for describing the ability of willing agencies to cooperate.  It was 
demonstrated that the Emergency Management System of Monterey County 
operates as a networked organization, with multiple, largely independent nodes 
coordinating their activities in order to generate a more effect emergency 
response.  It was also shown that the ability of such an organization to effectively 
cooperate is indicated by the ability of the organization to share information and 
resources between the nodes.  Information technologies, while not a panacea for 
the lack of interagency cooperation, can improve the ability of agencies to share 
information, particularly when used to develop critical aspects of a system’s 
information architecture.  Furthermore, even potential improvements to this 
architecture can result in improved coordination and the consideration of more 




This thesis has examined the role of interagency cooperation in homeland 
security preparedness and emergency management in Monterey County, 
California, using three theoretical models from various disciplines.  Each one of 
these models is useful for explaining some aspects of interagency cooperation, 
but because they were developed for other purposes, none of the models alone 
provides a comprehensive representation of how interagency cooperation 
develops and impacts government at the local level.   
Because these models describe different factors, influences and impacts 
of interagency cooperation, it would be useful to consolidate their explanatory 
benefits into a single model.  Additionally the application of such a model 
indicates that there are steps local governments can take to encourage 
interagency cooperation, which would allow them to develop a more efficient and 
effective emergency management system in the current environment of 
increased risk and decreased budgets.  This chapter brings together the 
somewhat divergent approaches examined in Chapters II, III and IV, providing 
first a synopsis of the case study, then some ideas on how to developed a more 
integrated model of interagency cooperation, an overview of the policy 
recommendations indicated by the model and finally some suggestions for further 
study in the area of interagency cooperation. 
 
A. CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS 
The case of interagency cooperation for homeland security in Monterey 
County is intriguing for a number of reasons, the primary reason is the conclusion 
by participants in the March 2002 conference at NPS that the central coast in 
general was very well prepared in comparison to other, similar communities in 
the nation and that this was do in large part to the high level of cooperation that 
exists between the various agencies and governments responsible for providing 
emergency services.115  Additionally, this case was chosen for the availability of 
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information, its lack of a major metropolitan center and the wide diversity of 
governments, physical environments and risks.  The latter two factors suggest 
that this case could serve as a model for other local governments that are 
formulating their homeland security policies. 
The Emergency Services Management System (ESMS) in Monterey 
County is comprised of emergency services agencies from the federal 
government activities in the local area (the Presidio, NPS, etc.), twelve 
municipalities and the county government itself.  Additionally, non-governmental 
agencies, such as the Red Cross, and private sector enterprises, such as Pacific 
Gas and Electric, American Medical Response and several local hospitals, 
provide critical capabilities that contribute to the overall response. 
The structure of this system, and of the government of Monterey County 
itself, is such that there can be little centralized control over emergency services.  
Although the Office of Emergency Services is tasked with coordinating 
emergency response during a crisis, they have no standing authority to direct 
agencies to plan, develop or provide any particular capability, nor does OES 
receive any military-style command authority during a crisis itself.  Nevertheless, 
an examination of budgetary commitments and decisions indicates that for the 
most part, the various agencies take a coordinated approach to homeland 
security policy despite potentially diverse motivations during a period of severe 
budget constraints. 
Critical to the development of this level of interagency cooperation has 
been the involvement of a core group of professionals from various disciplines 
and agencies.  Members of this group have a growing level of influence in policy 
decisions and share a common set of beliefs regarding public service and safety, 
the benefits of interagency cooperation and the positive impact of innovation and 
technological improvements.  The members of this group represent the major 
sectors of emergency services, including emergency management, fire fighting, 
law enforcement and health services, and consistently take positions that might 
not be considered as representative of their institutional interests, but are in the 
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best interest of the community at large.  Particularly noteworthy has been the 
recent development of a unified CBRNE response plan that will maximize federal 
grant money to provide a regional response capability that is shared among 
several agencies.  The adoption of this plan required that several members of the 
group forgo grant money that was intended for their agencies so that the major 
equipment items required for the plan could be purchased. 
Integral to the adoption of such plans has been the development of 
information technologies that allow capabilities spread across various agencies 
to be employed in a coordinated and effective manner.  While many of these 
technologies are still emerging, the probable effects of short-term improvements 
to the information architecture of the ESMS were considered during the 
development of plans and policies that call for more interagency cooperation.  
Major improvements to the information architecture, such as the construction of 
the new combined emergency services center, will allow the various agencies to 
more readily exchange information during a crisis, while distributed technologies, 
such as GIS and mobile computer and command systems, will help ensure that 
field response units have the information they need. 
 
B. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has borrowed from three widely divergent models in the fields 
of international relations and information science.  While none of these models 
alone is fully applicable to the case of interagency cooperation at the local level, 
they all provide insight into various aspects of the case.  Bureaucratic Political 
models can be used to describe the structural aspects of a government that can 
either hinder or provide increased opportunities for interagency cooperation.  
Epistemic Community theory, and potentially the model of managed 
interdependence described  by  Haas,  helps  to  explain   the  role   of   influence   
groups   in   the development of interagency cooperation.  Finally, networking 
theory provides a means to incorporate the growing influence of technological 
innovation into an integrated model of interagency cooperation . 
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The Bureaucratic Political model was developed and is typically used for a 
detailed analysis of the decision-making process of a national government, 
particularly in a period of international crises.  The model shows that even in 
cases of intense stress, when clear national interests are at stake, decisions are 
often made on the basis of bargaining and arbitration between key players who 
represent their institutional rather than the national interest.  According to this 
model, this same process would exist during less critical periods as well, and the 
general process of government is one of trade-offs, winners and losers.  In this 
case presented here however, the bureaucratic bargaining process seems less 
well defined, but this does not mean that the model is completely inapplicable.  
The differences in the structure of the systems -- local government agencies 
acting in a more secure and stable environment, as opposed to a national 
government acting in an insecure, anarchic environment -- may account, as least 
in part for the different outcomes.  The structure of a local system, including the 
lack of a central executive, multiple chains of authority, more overlap in 
institutional motivations and a more constrained budget, indicates a system that 
has fewer obstacles to interagency cooperation, but it does not, in and of itself 
provide an impetus for cooperation. 
Epistemic Community theory adds to an understanding of interagency 
cooperation by examining on source of cooperative efforts.  This theory has been 
useful in explaining cooperation is a variety of settings, including the 
development of international arms control treaties and the development of 
coherent environmental policies at various levels of government.  The strict 
definitions that have developed to differentiate an epistemic community from 
other influence groups make the application of the theory more difficult in cases 
such as the one discussed here for a number of reasons.  First, the “community” 
involved in developing and implementing emergency services is less 
academically oriented that many of the other communities that have been 
studied, therefore there is a smaller body of writings and academic backgrounds 
that would indicate how and where a community’s value system developed.  
Second, because the members of such a community are more likely to work 
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together on a daily basis on a variety of issues they may be less likely to discuss 
differences of opinion and approach with an outside researcher -- potentially 
indicating a higher level of cooperation than actually exists.  Finally, because 
local government practices are to some extent less formal than those of higher 
level of governments there may be less documentary evidence (in the form of 
minutes, statues, etc) on which judgments concerning the influence of the group 
can be based.116  Nevertheless the influence of “epistemic community-like” 
groups within local governments is clear, and when the vagaries of definition can 
be accounted for, the other aspects of epistemic community theory, including 
avenues of influence and the coordination of policy, provides tremendous insight 
into the process of developing interagency cooperation.  Examining the role of 
epistemic community-like groups within the context of a broader model of 
organizational learning and the role of ideas would be even more beneficial. 
Network theory is an emerging group of models that draws from a diverse 
range of fields including computer sciences, organizational decision-making 
theory, business, and epidemiology, among others.  The various models describe 
the ways in which nodes (humans, computers, microbes, etc.) interact and the 
effect these interactions have on the nodes.  Recent application of the models in 
the areas of defense analysis and business indicate that the information 
infrastructure of an organization can have a profound impact on the way that the 
organization makes decisions and conducts its activities.  While some 
proponents claim that improvements in the information architecture alone could 
account for the development of interagency cooperation, most theorists 
recognize that the structure of the organization itself must be compatible with 
information architecture and that there must be a decision at some or multiple 
levels in favor of cooperation for it to develop.  The information architecture 
however gives nodes the ability to cooperate when the other factors allow for and 
encourage it.  Furthermore, known, potential improvements to the information 
architecture can have the effect of fostering interagency cooperation, especially 
                                            
116 It should be noted here that this was certainly NOT the situation in this case.  In general 
the agencies within the various governments of Monterey County keep abundant and accurate 
records of meetings and decisions and readily made this information available.   
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in the area of homeland security preparedness, in that they allow planners and 
policy makers to anticipate the ability to more efficiently exchange information as 
they develop policies and response plans. 
None of these concepts is itself innovative, but taken together they can 
provide a more thorough representation of interagency cooperation at the local 
level.  Such an integrated model of interagency cooperation at the local then 
should consider three fundamental facets of the interagency process: the 
structure of the system, the role of ideas and group learning, and the impact of 
information technology.  According to this integrated model, interagency 
cooperation, that is, the unmandated coordination of activities and/or sharing of 
resources between two or more agencies, is more likely to develop (1) if the 
agencies operate in a system that has few structural barriers to cooperation, (2) if 
there is a group of public officials in the various agencies that share ideas and 
values concerning the benefits of cooperation and (3) if the information 
architecture does, or could in the near future, support the efficient exchange of 
information and distribution of decision making between the agencies. 
 
C. POLICY RECOMENDATIONS 
This model, when applied to the case studied here, suggests that there 
are policies that local government can adopt that might enhance the homeland 
security preparedness of the community, and enhance the overall level of 
interagency cooperation as well.  These recommendations have been discussed 
in more detail in their respective chapters, but are summarized here. 
· Establish a decision-making process that involves less arbitration 
by an executive agent and more peer-to-peer negotiation. 
· Decrease institutional barriers to cooperation by protecting the 
resources saved through cooperation. 
· Don’t impose regimes of communication and collaboration that stifle 
real cooperation. 
· Foster cooperation within existing groups by allowing them 
opportunities to coordinate and giving them authority to develop 
cooperative efforts. 
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· Adopt policies that support cooperation.  That is, rather than 
mandate coordination, officially state that cooperative efforts in 
general are encouraged, then protect agencies and officials who 
develop cooperative efforts.   
· Foster the growth of cooperative communities, by including 
outsiders and subordinates in cooperative efforts and coordination 
activities. 
· Examine (and if warranted modify) the structure of the ESM 
network to pair decision-making authority with information 
availability. 
· Target improvement in the information architecture towards 
providing more accurate and timely information to field response 
units and critical decision nodes. 
· Consider near-term architecture improvements during response 
planning. 
 
These suggestions fall into three general categories, those that may 
involve the restructuring of agencies or a change in supervisory relationships, 
those that may require significant financial commitments and those that can be 
adopted as a management style or organizational culture.  Each of these 
categories suggests different barriers to the adoption of the recommendations, 
which, depending on the particular situation, may themselves be insurmountable.   
In some situations, charters, documents of incorporation or constitutions 
may prevent governments from changing the structure and operation of their 
emergency management system, In others, as in Monterey County, severe 
budget shortfalls will limit the improvements that a government can make to their 
information architecture.  Most difficult in many situations, however, will be the 
adoption of recommendations that call for change in management style or 
organizational culture.  While these types of changes may require little in terms of 
legislation or financial capital, they involve the changing of the attitudes, values 
and perceptions of individuals.   
Furthermore it is difficult to prioritize these suggestions in terms of their 
potential impact on cooperation in other settings.  Intuitively, however, the 
biggest gains result from addressing those areas that most hinder cooperation.  
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For example if a local government has a well-developed information 
infrastructure, but has significant bureaucratic barriers to cooperation they would 
probably be best served by working to overcome these barriers. 
 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis was limited to the examination of those agencies that work 
directly with the Monterey County Offices of Emergency Services, however in 
practice, interagency cooperation within the Monterey County Emergency 
Management System extends beyond this to include a large number of municipal 
governments and agencies, private enterprises that provide services to the 
municipalities and a vast array of NGOs that are active during emergency 
situations including volunteer response groups, churches and service 
organizations.  Further investigation into the impact of these groups on homeland 
security along the central coast would be beneficial, especially for local 
governments wanting to increase the participation of the local population in 
preparedness efforts. 
Additionally, the integrated theory proposed here is by no means 
complete.   Most importantly the role of ideas in the development of interagency 
cooperation should be more thoroughly investigated in order to gain a better 
understanding of how concepts like the unified CBRNE response plan discussed 
here are conceived, developed and adopted as policy.  There is also opportunity 
to further investigate the role of organizational structure through a comparative 
study of different local government systems and the effect these systems have 
on interagency cooperation.    Finally the area of  network  analysis  holds  many 
opportunities for further study, not just in the role of information technologies, but 
in the role of social networks, human factors of information exchange and the 
potential for information overload during crisis situations. 
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